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ABSTRACT	
	
	 The	aim	of	the	project	is	to	analyze	and	understand	the	events	that	have	taken	
place	throughout	history	in	Argentina,	which	have	made	a	country	that	had	incredible	
potential	suffer	devastating	economic	and	political	situations,	ending	in	one	of	the	most	
serious	 defaults	 in	 history.	 Additionally,	 the	 project	 summarizes	 in	 a	 SWOT	 Analysis	
(Strengths,	 Weaknesses,	 Opportunities	 and	 Threats)	 the	 situation	 that	 Argentina	 is	
currently	living,	under	the	new	government	that	started	in	2015	with	President	Mauricio	
Macri.	Thanks	to	recently	instituted	policies,	Argentina	has	been	able	to	introduce	itself	
again	 in	the	 international	trading	market	and	 is	now	one	of	the	emerging	economies	
with	a	brighter	future.		
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1. INTRODUCTION	
	
	
	 According	to	an	article	published	by	The	Economist	(2014):	“In	1914,	Argentina	
stood	out	as	the	country	of	the	future.	Its	GDP	per	head	was	higher	than	Germany’s,	
France’s	or	Italy’s.	It	boasted	wonderfully	fertile	agricultural	land,	a	sunny	climate,	a	new	
democracy	(universal	male	suffrage	was	introduced	in	1912),	an	educated	population	
and	the	world’s	most	erotic	dance.	 Immigrants	 tangoed	 in	 from	everywhere.	For	 the	
young	and	ambitious,	the	choice	between	Argentina	and	California	was	a	hard	one”.	
	
	 The	aim	of	this	project	is	to	analyze,	explain	and	understand	the	evolution	of	the	
path	travelled	by	Argentina	throughout	this	century,	from	a	future	of	unlimited	growth	
and	wellbeing	to	economic	and	political	chaos.	The	report	analyzes	key	events	of	three	
selected	areas	considered	of	importance:	Agriculture,	Manufacturing	and	Banking	and	
finance.	Moreover,	the	project	tries	to	describe	Argentina’s	current	outlook	as	well	as	
the	 expected	 behavior	 of	 the	 economy	within	 the	 near	 future.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 it	
provides	an	analysis	of	Argentina’s	Strengths,	Weaknesses,	Opportunities	and	Threats	
(SWOT	Analysis).		
	
Section	1,	Agriculture,	begins	with	an	explanation	of	the	role	that	Agriculture	has	
played	 in	 Argentina.	 Compared	 to	 its	 neighbors	 in	 the	 region,	 Argentina	 has	 had	 a	
comparative	advantage	when	it	comes	to	Agriculture	as	it	has	been	endowed	with	very	
fertile	 lands	 and	 favorable	 climatic	 conditions.	 Therefore,	 the	 sector	 has	 allowed	
Argentina	to	enter	the	international	market	and	has	been	a	very	important	source	of	
income	 for	 the	 country.	 The	 Section	 continues	 with	 a	 description	 of	 the	 Argentine	
Agriculture	specialization,	highlighting	its	main	crops	and	most	fertile	lands.	The	chapter	
closes	 with	 the	 evolution	 of	 Argentina’s	 policies	 towards	 agriculture,	 how	 have	 the	
different	political	regimes	favored	or	hindered	the	sector.		
	
The	second	section	of	the	project	is	dedicated	to	Manufacturing.	Starting	with	
the	Agro-Export	model	and	the	first	phase	of	Argentina’s	industrialization	(1880-1930),	
the	period	was	marked	by	investment	in	industrial	infrastructure,	significant	migration	
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from	Europe	and	a	strong	dependence	on	the	European	continent,	which	was	the	reason	
why	 the	 period	 ended.	 The	 second	 Phase,	 Juan	 Peron’s	 Imports	 Substitution	model	
(1930-late	 to	1970s),	 influenced	by	Peron’s	admiration	 for	 the	 rapid	 industrialization	
that	Mussolini	 carried	 out	 in	 Italy.	 During	 this	 period,	manufacturing	 became	 a	 very	
important	player	in	Argentina’s	economy.	Policies	were	aimed	to	favor	the	sector	and	
boost	the	internal	production	of	goods	that	were	being	imported	from	the	outside.	In	
1976	 came	 the	Military	 Dictatorship	 and	 the	 Third	 Phase	 of	 Industrialization,	 which	
lasted	until	1990s.	The	main	feature	of	this	era	is,	in	contrast	with	Peron’s	trends,	the	
opening	of	the	country	to	the	international	market,	eliminating	disincentives	towards	
imports.	 In	 1991	 starts	 the	 so-called	 “Convertibility	 Plan”	 and	 with	 it	 the	 de-
industrialization	of	the	country.	Next,	the	Kirchnerism	that	started	in	2005	with	election	
of	President	Nestor	Kirchner.	Overall,	he	brought	in	a	more	regulated	period,	with	the	
introduction	of	export	taxes	again	and	the	refusal	of	President	Nestor	Kirchner	to	be	
part	of	the	Free	Trade	Area	of	the	Americas	(FTAA),	a	proposition	for	the	creation	of	a	
free	trade	zone	from	Alaska	to	Tierra	del	Fuego.	
	
Banking	 and	 Finance,	 the	 third	 part	 of	 the	 project	 explains	 the	 different	
monetary	 regimes	 throughout	history,	 starting	with	 the	Military	dictatorship	and	 the	
Financial	Reform	of	1977	under	Martinez	de	Hoz,	the	Minister	of	Economy	at	the	time.	
Because	 the	 reform	did	 not	meet	 its	main	objective	 of	 decreasing	 inflation,	 another	
attempt	 called	 the	 “Tablita”	 took	 place	 in	 1978,	 which	 consisted	 of	 a	 programmed	
devaluation	 of	 the	 peso	 based	 on	 a	 conversion	 table.	 The	 measure	 led	 to	 the	
propagation	 of	 speculative	 capitals	 and	 the	 “financial	 bicycle”,	 a	 period	 where	
Argentines	made	a	lot	of	easy	money.	The	project	then	continues	explaining	the	“Austral	
Plan”	 under	 Raúl	 Alfonsín’s	 presidency	 and	 the	 measures	 and	 consequences	 of	 the	
Convertibility	 Plan,	 which	 led	 to	 Argentina	 strongly	 depending	 on	 the	 inflows	 and	
outflows	of	foreign	currency.	Because	of	this,	during	the	1990s,	due	to	several	external	
shocks	such	as	the	Asian	Crisis	of	1997,	the	Convertibility	Plan	started	to	show	its	first	
evidence	of	decay	and	ended	in	2001,	after	the	third	Default	of	Argentina	on	its	external	
debt.	From	that	point,	the	thesis	explains	how	different	authorities	tried	to	reactivate	
the	economy.	A	 very	 important	part	of	 the	 study	 is	 the	debt	 renegotiation,	which	 is	
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	 explained	 in	 detail.	 The	 section	 ends	 with	 Argentina’s	 return	 to	 international	
trading	in	2015,	under	its	current	President	Mauricio	Macri’s	government.		
The	 last	 Section	 of	 the	 project,	 Section	 4,	 contains	 a	 SWOT	 analysis	 of	 the	
situation	that	Argentina	is	currently	living,	after	all	its	complicated	past.	It	is	a	country	
with	 a	 lot	 of	 advantages	 (Strengths),	 generally	 marked	 negatively	 by	 its	 past	
(Weaknesses),	with	a	lot	of	potential	(Opportunities)	but	needs	to	be	carefully	managed	
to	avoid	repeating	its	history	(Threats).	
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2. AGRICULTURE	
	
2.1. Agriculture’s	role	in	Argentina	
	
The	agricultural	sector	has	always	played	and	continues	to	play	a	very	important	
role	in	the	Argentina’s	economic	growth	and	evolution	because	of	its	high	impact	on	the	
GDP,	 employment	 and	 regional	 development.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 key	 reason	 for	 important	
positioning	of	Argentine	internationally	as	a	supplier	of	aliments	(being	this	sector	its	
most	competitive	conglomerate	production	as	a	whole	and	in	each	of	its	regions).	
	
It	has	been	critically	 important	throughout	the	history	of	Argentina.	Deep	and	
rich	soils,	temperate	climate,	adequate	rainfall	and	good	access	to	maritime	transport	
give	Argentina	 an	 exceptional	 potential	 for	 agricultural	 production.	 This	 has	 allowed	
agriculture	to	perform	well	despite	more	than	50	years	of	largely	unfavorable	policies	
by	the	government	to	the	detriment	of	agriculture	and	for	the	benefit	of	manufacturing.	
After	the	third	default	in	2001,	the	agriculture	sector	has	played	a	very	significant	role	
in	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 economy.	 According	 to	 the	 INDEC	 (2017),	 the	 country	 has	 a	
continental	 surface	 of	 2.8	 million	 square	 kilometers	 and	 a	 37.2%	 is	 dedicated	 to	
Agriculture.		In	2003,	the	sector	was	responsible	for	the	11%	of	the	total	GDP.	(The	World	
Bank	Group).	
	
One	of	the	key	features	of	Argentina’s	agriculture	is	that	it	has	the	potential	to	
not	only	feed	the	country	itself	but	export	around	the	world	too.	For	instance,	on	2014,	
a	 42%	of	 the	world	 exported	 soymeal	 came	 from	Argentina	 (David	 E.	 Bell	 and	Mary	
Shelman,	 2015).	 The	 INDEC	 estimated	 that	 for	 the	 years	 2013	 and	 2014,	 the	 total	
production	of	the	most	important	crops	totaled	53,000	tons	constituting	the	60%	of	the	
country’s	total	exports.	
	
The	 agricultural	 sector	 is	 one	 of	 the	 few	 industries	 in	 Argentina	 that	 has	
presented	a	positive	trade	balance	throughout	the	past	years.	The	following	table	shows	
the	average	of	exports	and	imports	(in	millions	of	dollars)	between	the	years	2011	and	
2015	of	different	sectors	and	their	trade	balance.	
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Agriculture	is	also	an	important	but	albeit	small	source	of	employment	for	the	
Argentines.	 The	 Argentine	 agriculture	 tends	 to	 be	 technologically	 advanced	 and	
productive	and	despite	the	small	employment	numbers,	 it	creates	significant	value	in	
economic	 production.	 The	 World	 Bank	 Group	 estimates	 that	 in	 2011,	 the	 total	
population	of	Argentina	was	of	41.6	million	and	3.1%	worked	in	the	agribusiness	sector	
(Statista:	The	Statistics	Portal),	so	that	is	approximately	1.29	million	generated	positions.	
Moreover,	 it	 also	 carries	 a	 lot	 of	 indirect	 jobs	 with	 it	 such	 as	 transportation	 and	
commerce	related.		
	
2.2. Argentine	Agriculture	specialization	
	
	 The	 agro-industrial	 production	 has	 an	 extensive	 geographical	 coverage	
throughout	 the	 country,	 therefore	 the	 conservation	 of	 a	 lot	 of	 its	 natural	 resources	
depends	 on	 these	 activities.	 Also,	 the	 poorest	 regions	 of	 Argentina	 practically	 only	
dedicate	themselves	to	this	sector	so	its	economic	and	social	development	depend	on	
it	too.	
	
	 The	most	important	agricultural	region	is	the	oriental	Pampa	and	the	south	of	
Mesopotamia,	with	favorable	soils	and	climate	for	the	cultivation	of	cereals,	oilseeds,	
fodder,	fruit	and	vegetables.	Tropical	crops	find	its	favorable	conditions	to	grow	in	other	
areas	 like	 the	Northeast	of	 Formosa,	 the	North	of	 Salta	 and	 the	areas	 around	 Jujuy.	
There	are	also	large	areas	where	agriculture	is	only	possible	with	the	help	of	artificial	
irrigation,	 and	 the	 land	 is	 used	 for	 high-value	 crops	 such	 as	 fruit	 and	 vegetables.	
Table  1: Arithmetic Average, years 2011-2015. Source: World Trade Organization 
Indicator Exports Imports Trade	balance
Agricultural	products 202,86 11,9 190,96
Fuels 18,1 46,77 -28,67
Manufactures 113,6 269,42 -155,82
Machinery	and	transport	equipment 58,04 152,53 -94,5
Office	and	telecom	equipments 521 29,05 -28,53
Textiles 1,06 5,72 -4,66
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Examples	of	these	are	the	arid	provinces	Cuyanas,	the	Northwest	and	the	Patagonian	
zone.	
	
Due	to	the	volume	of	production	and	cultivated	area,	cereals	and	oilseeds	are	
considered	the	main	crops	of	the	country.	Cereals	include	wheat	and	maize	production	
and	oilseeds	consist	of	soybean	and	sunflower.	The	OEC	estimated	that	in	2015,	soybean	
meal	represented	16.6%	of	the	total	exports	of	Argentina.	During	the	last	four	decades,	
its	 production	 has	 been	 increasing	 and	 in	 2016,	 the	 total	 production	was	 of	 34.350	
million	metric	tons,	the	highest	volume	since	1977	(Index	Mundi).	According	to	a	study	
published	by	the	OECD	(2008),	the	production	of	soybean	became	important	between	
2005	and	2007,	when	prices	nearly	doubled.	As	for	cereals,	the	most	grown	is	wheat,	
with	a	cultivated	area	of	approximately	6.3	million	hectares	and	followed	by	3.1	million	
of	maize.	(FAO)	
	
Industrial	crops	are	also	very	relevant	in	the	Argentine	agriculture	and	tend	to	be	
cultivated	in	the	north	of	the	country	due	to	their	need	of	hot	and	humid	climates.	These	
include	cotton,	sugar	cane,	tobacco,	yerba	mate	and	tea,	among	others.	They	are	called	
industrial	because,	unless	they	are	subject	of	an	industrial	process,	they	have	no	utility	
freshly	harvested.	
	
Nowadays,	Argentina	 is	the	world’s	 leading	exporter	of	 lemons	and	pears	and	
occupies	a	minor	place	in	the	export	of	apples	and	other	citrus	fruits	such	as	oranges	
and	mandarins.	The	exportation	of	apples	has	fallen	due	to	the	poor	offered	variety,	
specializing	their	production	in	two	types;	Red	and	Granny.	Per	a	study	carried	out	by	
the	Department	of	Pomology	of	Rio	Negro,	apple	exports	declined	a	46.83%	from	2009	
to	2014.	
	
Horticultural	crops	are	gown	around	some	big	cities	such	as	Buenos	Aires	and	
Mar	del	Plata.	The	highest	production	of	winter	vegetables	takes	place	in	the	valley	of	
River	San	Francisco	(Jujuy).	Also,	 the	tomato	crop	 in	Mendoza	should	be	highlighted,	
which	is	mainly	intended	for	preserves’	production.		
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	 Fodder	is	used	to	feed	livestock.	They	are	usually	developed	in	areas	with	
less	ability	for	other	crops,	as	they	are	resistant	to	different	types	of	water	stress	and	
climate	(such	as	those	caused	by	floods	or	droughts)	and	adapt	to	a	wide	range	of	soils.	
Together,	 forage	 farmers	 occupy	 the	 largest	 area	 of	 land	 planted	 with	 crops	 in	 the	
country.	Most	of	 the	 fodder	 is	directly	 consumed	by	animals,	while	a	 smaller	part	 is	
harvested.		
	
In	 recent	years,	medium	and	small	businesses,	 trying	 to	 find	new	exportation	
alternatives	have	developed	the	production	of	non-traditional	crops	such	as	stone	fruits	
(apricot,	peach…),	fine	fruits	(also	called	berries),	tropical	fruits	(mango,	papaya…),	kiwi	
and	dried	fruit.	These	products,	because	of	their	volume,	represent	a	small	part	of	the	
Argentine	 agribusiness	 production	 and	 exports.	 Because	 they	 are	 different,	 they	 are	
considered	 to	have	a	greater	value	 than	 traditional	 crops	because	of	 specific	natural	
attributes.		
	
	
2.3. Argentina’s	policies	towards	agriculture	
	
There	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 agriculture	 and	 economic	 growth	 and	 in	
Argentina,	for	several	decades	of	the	last	century,	this	relationship	has	been	distorted.	
The	industrialization/manufacturing	has	been	emphasized	at	the	expense	of	agriculture,	
undermining	the	potential	of	agriculture	to	contribute	to	the	national	development.	The	
national	 goal	 of	 industrialization	 was	 adopted	 by	 Juan	 Peron	 and	 was	 followed	 by	
successive	 governments	 for	quite	 a	 long	 time.	 	 The	emphasis	on	manufacturing	 also	
made	 subsidizing	 it	 a	 common	 practice,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 taxpayer	 and	 other	
sectors.	
	
Until	1930	Argentina	had	undergone	a	large	period	of	agricultural	expansion	due	
to	the	labor	input	supported	by	European	immigration	and	a	high	level	of	investments,	
both	 in	 agricultural	 holdings	 and	 infrastructure.	 This	 period	was	 characterized	 by	 an	
important	 development	 in	 basic	 products.	 Until	 then	 the	 economy	 was	 very	 open,	
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international	 trade	 of	 great	 importance	 for	 the	 economy	 and	 there	 was	 no	 direct	
taxation	on	agricultural	exports.		
	
The	rally	ended	with	the	collapse	of	prices	during	the	Great	Depression	in	1930.	
During	these	years,	large	outflows	of	foreign	capital	took	place	and	there	was	a	sharp	
international	decline	in	agriculture	related	product’s	prices.	This	situation	was	followed	
by	World	War	 II	 during	 which,	 because	 of	 the	 blocking	 of	 the	maritime	 commerce,	
Argentina	accumulated	huge	quantities	of	cereal	reserves	that	could	not	sell.	
	
Because	of	the	disappointing	experience	with	the	international	trade,	pessimism	
lead	 to	 questioning	 the	 role	 of	 the	 sector	 in	 the	 economic	maintenance.	 This	 trend	
marked	 the	 growth	of	 a	 policy	 that	 promoted	 the	 industrial	 development	 to	 reduce	
imports	 and	 the	 imposition	of	 taxes	on	 the	agricultural	 sector	 (overvalued	exchange	
rates	made	exports	 of	 grains	 difficult	 and	export	 duties	 on	 cereals	 and	beef,	 among	
others),	 pushed	Argentina	 back	 from	 the	 international	market.	 The	 protectionism	 in	
favor	 of	 manufacturing	 also	 created	 a	 domestically	 oriented	 industry	 with	 high	
production	costs	with	inefficient	tendencies.	
	
In	the	late	1980s,	Argentina’s	economy	was	characterized	by	instability.	In	the	
year	 1989,	 inflation	 rate	 reached	 3,071%	 (The	World	 Bank	 Group).	 President	 Carlos	
Menem’s	government	embarked	in	a	“free	market”	path.	With	the	convertibility	plan1,	
which	pegged	the	Argentine	peso	to	 the	U.S.	Dollar,	economic	 reforms	took	place	 in	
order	 to	 stabilize	 economy	 and	 create	 a	 more	 liberal	 policy	 regime	 favorable	 to	
agricultural	investment,	production	and	exports.	These	policies	included	elimination	of	
quantitative	export	restrictions,	elimination	of	distorting	taxes	in	fuels	and	removal	of	
inefficiencies	and	monopoly	profits	in	the	trade	channels	(transportation,	elevators	and	
ports).	This	more	stable	environment	encouraged	farmer	to	invest	in	better	inputs	and	
more	efficient	machinery.			
	
																																																						
1 The Convertibility Plan will be discussed in Section 4.3 
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	 During	 the	 years	 of	 1991-2001	 the	 Argentine	 governments	 continued	
liberalization,	privatization	and	the	dollarization	process,	by	which	Argentina	adopted	
the	U.S.	Dollar	as	its	only	currency	closing	the	peso-dollar	 interest	rate	spreads.	Also,	
the	start	of	MERCOSUR	{the	Common	Market	of	the	South	America}	took	place.		All	of	
them	helping	the	agricultural	sector’s	economic	and	political	well-being.	
	
In	 2001,	 a	 federal	 budget	 crisis	 led	 to	 public	 debt	 default	 and	 devaluation.	
Argentina	was	marked	 by	macroeconomic	 imbalances	with	 the	 overvaluation	 of	 the	
currency	and	the	lack	of	credit.	These	facts	changed	the	situation	for	the	vast	majority	
of	agricultural	producers.	In	2003,	President	Nestor	Kirchner	re-introduced	export	taxes	
on	agricultural	products	as	president	Menem	had	eliminated	them.	Despite	of	the	high	
export	taxes,	which	for	example	reached	a	35%	in	soybeans	in	2007	(William	N.	Dowd,	
2009),	 new	 investors	were	willing	 to	 open	business	 in	 farming.	 	Most	 of	 them	were	
motivated	by	their	lack	of	trust	in	the	baking/financial	system	and	valued	the	ability	to	
sell	in	dollars	terms	overseas	rather	than	pesos.			
	
The	 fall	 in	 Argentine	 Pesos	 in	 the	 21st	 Century,	 turned	 Argentine	 products	
cheaper	in	an	international	market	and,	as	well	as	Argentina	is	known	for	consuming	the	
same	goods	they	export,	prices	in	the	domestic	markets	and	inflation	rose	along	with	
decline	in	Peso	exchange	rate.	For	example,	 in	the	period	of	2000	to	2005	exports	of	
soybeans	increased	form	4.1	billion	tones	to	9.96	billion	tones,	respectively,	which	is	an	
increase	of	141.6%	(FAO).		
	
President	Cristina	Kirchner’s,	who	had	taken	over	from	her	husband	as	president	
of	 the	country	 in	2007,	 increased	export	 taxes	to	take	advantage	of	 the	sudden	high	
revenue	coming	from	exports	and	with	the	aim	of	controlling	inflation	to	make	goods	
more	accessible	to	domestic	buyers.			
	
In	 March	 2008,	 Cristina	 Kirchner	 made	 an	 executive	 law	 that	 rose	 taxes	 for	
soybeans	 again	 from	35%	 to	 44.1%	 (William	N.	Dowd,	 2009).	 She	 introduced	 a	 new	
sliding-scale	 tax	 system	 that	 generated	 major	 protests	 and	 strikes	 from	 farmers	
nationwide,	it	was	the	first	time	that	the	farmers	had	gathered	against	the	law.	The	new	
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taxation	put	a	ceiling	on	farmers’	income	no	matter	how	high	international	prices	rise.	
Three	months	later,	in	June	2008,	Kirchner	asked	the	Congress	to	vote	for	the	proposal	
to	legitimize	the	system.	To	the	surprise	of	all,	the	general	vote	was	against	the	proposal	
so	 Cristina	 had	 to	 lower	 the	 soybean	 tax	 to	 its	 original	 value,	 a	 35	 percent.	 It	 was	
considered	by	the	farmers	a	victory	against	the	government.		
	
Although	farmers	won	that	battle,	they	faced	other	conditions	at	the	same	time.	
Argentina	suffered	a	drastic	drought,	the	worst	in	the	past	100	years,	that	resulted	in	a	
very	 low	 crop	 yield	 so	 prices	 rose	 again.	 Crop	 yield	 of	wheat	 decreased	 by	 a	 30.6%	
between	2008	and	2009,	soybean’s	yield	also	declined	by	a	35.5%	in	the	same	period.	
(FAO)	
	
Motivated	by	 their	 last	 success,	 farmer	demanded	 for	 a	new	decrease	of	 the	
export	 taxes.	 The	 government	 did	 not	 succumb	 to	 their	 demands	 but,	 instead,	 they	
offered	them	to	share	30	percent	of	the	tax	export	revenue	with	the	provinces.	
	
	 Given	 the	political	 and	economic	environment,	 agriculture	 took	 its	own	path.	
Beneficial	technological	advances	were	developed	and	marked	a	new	era	for	the	sector;	
productivity,	mechanization	and	increased	scale.		
	
	 The	years	2010	and	2011	were	excellent	years	for	Argentina’s	agriculture.	Even	
though	 export	 taxes	 were	 still	 high,	 cultivated	 area	 was	 expanded	 thanks	 to	 new	
technologies,	a	highly	competitive	real	exchange	rate	and	the	global	rising	of	commodity	
prices.	Argentina	became	one	of	the	top	exporters	of	several	products.	
	
Argentina’s	 income	 from	 exports	 was	 reduced	 in	 2014	 due	 to	 the	 drop	 of	
commodity	prices.	Argentina’s	economy	remained	heavily	dependent	on	commodities.	
Agricultural	products	and	agriculture-	related	manufacturing	were	about	60	percent	of	
total	exports.	Capital	goods	and	intermediate	inputs	comprise	about	70	percent	of	total	
imports,	 making	 the	 economy	 highly	 dependent	 on	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 revenues	
generated	by	the	commodity	sector.	The	price	of	soybeans	(soy	products	accounted	for	
30	percent	of	Argentina’s	total	exports)	dropped	by	30	percent	since	early	2014,	and	
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	 other	important	export	commodities,	such	as	corn	and	wheat,	saw	significant	price	
declines.		
	
In	2015,	as	soon	as	President	Mauricio	Macri	took	over	he	arranged	a	new	policy	
to	 liberalize	 the	 agriculture	 sector.	 This	 new	 trend	was	 opposed	 to	 the	 one	 that	 his	
predecessor,	 Cristina	 Fernández,	 had	 clung.	 During	 her	 presidency,	 she	 established	
severe	 restrictions	 on	 imports.	 For	 example,	 it	 became	mandatory	 to	 associate	with	
companies	 that	exported	 in	order	 to	 import	 another	product	of	 the	 same	value	and	
many	of	the	import	permits	were	paralyzed	for	weeks.	These	obstacles	disappeared	with	
Macri.	
	
The	new	policy	 included	eliminating	export	permits	 for	 grains	 and	oilseeds,	 a	
decrease	on	export	tax	for	soybeans	from	35%	to	30%,	and	abolishing	most	other	export	
taxes	for	agricultural	commodities	like	beef	(it	was	taxed	at	15%),	corn	(20%)	and	wheat	
(23%)	 (David	 E.	 Bell,	 Forest	 Reinhardt	 and	 Natalie	 Kindred,	 2016).	 Macri	 propelled	
Argentina	 into	a	new	currency	era	by	 liberalizing	 the	peso	and	 letting	 it	 float	 freely.	
Argentina’s	peso	devaluated	for	as	much	as	a	30%	(Carolina	Milan,	2015).	Even	though	
the	risk	of	 inflation	increasing	was	higher,	this	policy	was	seen	by	his	supporters	as	a	
move	for	Argentina’s	regaining	credibility	in	the	global	financial	system.	These	reforms	
made	Argentina’s	agricultural	exports	more	competitive.	
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3. MANUFACTURING	
	
	 The	manufacturing	 sector	history	 in	Argentina	 shows	 its	dependence	and	 the	
correlation	with	its	historic	experience	of	the	two	world	wars,	and	incidentally	shows	it	
high	degree	of	dependence	with	Britain	in	particular.	
	
	 The	process	of	 industrialization	 in	Argentina	can	be	categorized	 in	 three	 large	
periods.	 The	 first	 one	 started	 around	 1880	 when	 the	 country	 entered	 into	 the	
international	markets	by	adopting	the	“Agro	export	model”	and	ended	with	the	Great	
Depression2,	in	1930.	The	second	period	is	characterized	by	the	adoption	of	the	import	
substitution	industrialization,	formally	adopted	by	Juan	Peron	in	1946,	which	lasted	until	
the	late	1970s.	The	third	of	them	began	by	the	failure	of	the	policy	opening3,	carried	out	
by	the	Military	Dictatorship4	in	1976,	and	was	extended	until	1990.	
	
3.1. Agro	export	model	and	the	First	Phase	of	Industrialization	(1880-1930)	
	
The	“agro	export	model”	was	based	on	the	existence	of	comparative	advantages	
in	agricultural	production	derived	from	the	exploitation	of	virgin	 lands	in	the	Pampas	
region,	which	was	 converted	 into	 the	 axis	 of	 an	 expansion	 that	 seemed	 to	 know	no	
limits;	endowment	of	 land	proved	to	be	endless,	while	soil	 fertility	made	agricultural	
production	highly	efficient.	Argentina	joined	the	world	through	exporting	its	meats	and	
grains,	 and	 achieved	 significant	 Balance	 of	 Goods	 account.	 The	 model	 required	
significant	investment	in	industrial	infrastructure	in	processing,	railroads,	and	packaging	
particularly	 in	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 country	 to	 get	 the	 food	 products	 to	 the	 ports	 and	
eventually	to	the	export	markets,	primarily	on	the	European	continent.	
The	Argentine	agro-export	boom	was	part	of	a	process	of	internationalization	of	
trade.	 The	 more	 developed	 economies	 in	 Europe	 were	 undergoing	 an	 industrial	
																																																						
2	The	Great	Depression,	also	know	as	the	crisis	of	29,	was	a	global	economic	crisis	that	lasted	during	the	1930s,	in	the	
years	before	the	World	War	II.	Its	duration	depends	on	the	countries	to	be	analyzed,	but	in	the	majority	began	around	
1929	and	extended	until	the	late	thirties	or	early	forties.	It	was	originated	in	the	United	States,	from	the	fall	of	the	
stock	market	of	October	29,	1929,	and	was	the	longest	and	deepest	depression	in	the	world	
3	The	Military	dictatorship	adopted	an	open	policy	materializing	in	a	free	market	plan.	The	man	in	charge	was	José	
Alfredo	Martínez	de	Hoz,	the	minister	of	economy	at	the	time.		It	consisted	of	the	elimination	of	all	price	controls,	
free	foreign	exchange	market,	free	trade,	free	exports,	free	imports,	opening	the	market	to	competition,	elimination	
of	subsidies	to	certain	privileged	sectors	and	freedom	for	foreign	investments.	
4	The	Military	dictatorship’s	policy	opening	began	in	1976	and	will	be	explained	later	in	this	section.	
	 13	
	 revolution	leading	to	excess	production	of	manufactured	goods	and	hence	their	
willingness	to	export,	and	an	increase	in	demand	for	food	and	raw	materials	needed	for	
its	 factories,	 which	 they	 had	 to	 import.	 Argentina’s	 exports	 of	 wheat	 in	 1885	 were	
100,000	tons	and	in	1913	they	reached	2,800,000	tons	(Alfredo	M.	Irigoin).	The	model	
allowed	Argentina	to	insert	itself	into	the	international	market	and	was	known	for	its	
exporting	of	raw	materials	and	food	stuff,	and	importing	of	external	capital	and	heavy	
machinery	 for	 investment.	 	 The	 double	 dependence	 of	 Argentina	 on	 the	 European	
Continent	and	in	particular	Great	Britain	as	its	biggest	trading	partner	exposed	Argentine	
to	the	economic	cycles	of	Europe.	
	
The	 trade	 was	 not	 the	 only	 growing	 segment	 in	 this	 period.	 	 There	 were	
significant	 migration	 of	 people	 to	 Argentina	 from	 Europe	 as	 well	 as	 significant	
investment	capital	from	Europe	to	Argentina	to	spend	on	industrialization.	For	instance,	
in	the	period	of	1890	to	1920	nearly	three	million	immigrants	travelled	from	Europe	to	
Argentina	seeking	for	better	salaries	and	the	possibility	of	social	mobility	(Rafael	Di	Tela	
and	 Ingrid	Vogel,	2001).	Also,	because	of	 the	 industrialization,	 the	old	continent	had	
capital	surplus	which	became	available	as	foreign	investment.	For	example,	at	the	end	
of	1913,	Great	Britain	had	invested	approximately	£319	million	in	Argentina	(William	N.	
Goetzmann	and	Andrey	D.	Ukhov,	2005),	especially	 in	the	railway	system.	 It	radiated	
from	Buenos	Aires	and	communicated	the	city	with	the	periphery.	The	system	played	a	
very	 important	 role	 in	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 interior	 provinces	 into	 the	 national	
economy	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 export	 sector	 as	 it	 ensured	 the	 rapid	 and	
inexpensive	 transportation	of	exportable	products	 from	these	areas	 to	Buenos	Aires,	
where	they	were	sent	to	Europe.		
	
The	 conditions	 for	 the	 country's	 incipient	 industrialization	 began	 to	 emerge.	
Among	them	can	be	mentioned:	
• The	existence	of	competitive	goods	of	the	primary	sector	that	required	some	
type	of	final	industrial	transformation	to	be	exported	(refrigerators,	leather,	
wool,	flour,	etc.).	
• The	European	immigration	flow	with	previous	qualifications	in	the	industrial	
sector.	
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• The	availability	of	a	rail	network	allowing	transport	of	products	at	low	cost.		
	
The	 golden	 era	 for	 Argentina	 did	 not	 last	 long.	 The	 country	 became	 heavily	
dependent	on	Europe	and	 its	ups	and	downs	affected	Argentina’s	 local	economy	too	
much.	In	1914,	The	First	World	War	broke	out	and,	even	though	Argentina	was	politically	
neutral,	 its	economy	drowned	with	 that	of	Europe.	The	war	 interrupted	 trade	 flows,	
demand	of	exports	decreased	and	the	country	was	prevented	from	the	supply	of	a	wide	
range	of	products	that	it	acquired	abroad.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 warfacts	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 “Agro	 export	
model”	are:	
• The	conflictive	relation	between	Argentina,	the	United	Stated	and	Great	Britain.	
As	it	has	already	been	mentioned,	Argentina	and	Great	Britain	had	had	a	close	
relationship	throughout	the	years.	During	and	after	the	First	World	War,	Britain	
lost	its	role	of	financial	pole	of	Argentina	as	the	United	States	became	a	great	
power.	American	capitals	started	to	gain	importance	in	the	Argentine	economy	
displacing	the	British.			
• Also,	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 international	Great	Depression	 crisis	 in	 the	 1930s,	
transformed	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 international	 order.	 As	 it	 has	 already	 been	
explained,	the	crisis	was	originated	in	the	United	States,	after	a	fall	in	stock	prices	
(the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average5	dropped	25%	(Kimberly	Amadeo,	2017)).	The	
decline	in	US	economic	activity	caused	the	collapse	of	the	multilateral	trading	
and	payment	system	and	was	accompanied	by	a	sharp	contraction	in	world	trade	
(decreasing	 approximately	 30%	 between	 1929	 and	 1932	 (Jacob	 E.	 Madsen	
(2001))	 and	 a	 resurgence	 of	 protectionist	 practices	 in	 industrial	 economies.	
Countries	 began	 to	 close	 their	 economies	 through	 tariffs	 and	 production	
intended	primarily	for	the	domestic	market.	This	radically	changed	the	position	
of	 the	Argentine	economy	 in	 the	world	order	as	 the	export	demand	declined	
significantly	and	so	its	export	prices	fell	dramatically.	
																																																						
5	 The	 Dow	 Jones	 Averages	 are	 stock	market	 indices	 that	 represent	 the	U.S.	 economy	 in	 three	 sectors:	 industry,	
transportation	and	utilities.	
	 15	
	 • However,	 the	model	not	only	 lost	 its	momentum	due	 to	external	events.	The	
Argentine	economy	had	considerably	grown	as	well	as	its	population	and	could	
no	longer	be	maintained	solely	on	the	basis	of	exports.	
	
3.2. Second	Phase;	Juan	Peron’s	Import	Substitution	(1930-late	1970s)	
	
Juan	Peron	spent	a	few	months	in	Italy	between	the	two	world	wars.		While	his	
mission	was	military	training	he	was	impressed	with	Mussolini’s	rapid	industrialization	
of	Italy	to	substitute	for	the	need	of	importing	heavy	machinery	and	equipment	and	for	
the	rest	of	his	life	and	career	he	tried	to	emulate	Italy’s	experience.	
	
During	 the	 import	 substitution	 process,	 the	manufacturing	 sector	 occupied	 a	
privileged	place	in	the	Argentine	economy.		As	its	name	suggests,	the	industrial	goods	
that	used	to	be	bought	from	the	outside	started	being	produced	by	the	country.	The	
model	was	aimed	at	self-sufficiency	in	food	and	industrial	products.	In	this	period,	the	
industrial	 production	 surpassed	 the	 agricultural	 production	 and	 textile,	 food	 and	
metallurgical	industries	faced	a	great	increase	in	size	and	output.	
	
There	were	three	main	pillar	of	import	substitution	model;	
1. An	active	industrial	policy	that	provided	subsides	and	direction	of	state	
to	produce	import	substitutes,	
2. Barriers	to	free	trade	(protectionism)	such	as	high	tariffs	on	imports,	and		
3. Under-valuing	the	Peso.	
	
The	model	of	 import	substitution	can	be	described	 in	two	substages.	The	first	
one,	 from	 the	end	of	 the	 “Agro	export	model”	 in	1930	until	 the	end	of	Peron’s	 first	
government,	in	1955.	The	second	substage	extends	from	1955	until	the	end	of	the	70s.		
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3.2.1. Import	substitution	model:	First	sub-stage	(1930-1955)	
	
In	this	new	sub-stage,	industrialization	deepened	in	an	accelerated	way.	It	was	
based	on	an	expansion	of	existing	activities,	through	the	intensive	use	of	labor,	and	a	
widening	of	the	domestic	market.	The	State	had	a	very	active	role	in	the	production	of	
basic	inputs	and	in	the	application	of	a	wide	range	of	policy	instruments:	administration	
of	import	quotas,	financing,	sector	promotion,	etc.		
	
The	first	protectionist	measure	took	place	on	October	10,	1931,	the	creation	of	
the	Exchange	Control	Commission.	It	intervened	in	the	market	to	distribute	the	foreign	
currencies	entering	the	economy	(earned	by	exporters),	responding	to	the	purpose	of	
giving	 foreign	 currency	 to	 those	 who	 were	 considered	 to	 have	 a	 greater	 collective	
benefit	through	imports.	This	distribution	of	changes,	in	the	face	of	excess	demand	for	
foreign	exchange,	implied	a	rationing.	The	established	parity	was	such	that	the	currency	
was	 overvalued,	 implying	 a	 stimulus	 to	 imports	 and	 a	 disincentive	 to	 exports.	 The	
objective	was	 precisely	 that	 the	 currency	 should	 not	 be	 depreciated	but	 to	 improve	
Argentina’s	balance	of	payment.		
	
As	mentioned	before,	because	of	the	First	World	War,	Great	Britain	abandoned	
its	position	as	Argentina’s	larger	trader	and	started	its	financial	being	replaced	by	new	
investors	 in	 the	 territory	 such	 as	 the	United	 States.	On	May	 1,	 1933,	 to	 protect	 the	
Argentine	economy	and	guarantee	its	trade	with	the	British	country,	the	“Paco	Roca-
Runciman”	was	signed.	As	its	name	suggests,	the	agreement	was	signed	by	the	British	
Trade	Minister	Sir	Walter	Runciman	and	the	vice	president	of	Argentina,	Julio	Roca.	By	
this,	England	was	committed	to	continue	buying	Argentine	meats	as	long	as	their	price	
was	 lower	than	the	other	suppliers.	On	the	other	hand,	Argentina	reduced	the	taxes	
levied	 on	 English	 products	 and	 granted	 preferential	 treatment	 for	 British	 companies	
based	in	Argentina	among	which	was	the	concession	of	all	means	of	public	transport	in	
the	 city	 of	 Buenos	 Aires	 to	 a	 British	 company	 called	 Transport	 Corporation.	
Concurrently,	the	Central	Bank	of	Argentina	was	created	with	such	important	functions	
as	monetary	issue	and	interest	rate	regulation,	with	a	large	presence	of	English	officials.		
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	 Upon	arrival	of	the	Second	World	War,	Argentine	faced	the	dual	problem	
of	being	unable	to	import	needed	industrial	products	and	losing	its	export	markets	for	
foodstuff.	 	 Peron’s	 import	 substitution	went	 into	 full	 swing	 to	 allow	 the	 country	 to	
withstand	the	war	far	away	but	impacting	its	economy	so	closely.	
	
In	1939,	 the	World	War	 II	 changed	the	picture	 for	most	of	 the	countries.	The	
Argentine	economy,	again,	was	affected	by	the	conflict.	As	mentioned,	for	Argentina,	
the	 progressive	 closure	 of	 European	 markets,	 resulting	 from	 the	 German	 victories,	
drastically	 reduced	 agricultural	 exports.	 The	 shortage	 of	 imports	 during	 the	 war	
promoted	a	protection	towards	Argentine	industries.		
As	a	result,	Argentina	started	exporting	its	industrial	goods	to	her	neighbors	in	the	region	
to	maintain	its	growth	in	textiles,	clothing,	food	and	beverages,	footwear	and	chemical	
products	in	the	Argentine	industrial	sector.		
	
In	 1946,	 with	 election	 of	 Juan	 Domingo	 Perón,	 a	 five-year	 plan	 aimed	 for	
economic	independence	was	enacted.	The	measures’	goal	were:	
• Expand	the	internal	market	instead	of	boosting	traditional	exports	to	reduce	
foreign	dependence,		
• raise	productivity,		
• improve	the	distribution	of	wealth	and		
• accelerate	industrialization.		
	
His	government	also	reacted	to	short-term	economic	and	political	pressures.	For	
example,	he	established	policies	that	protected	post-war	 industries,	he	saved	private	
companies	from	bankruptcy	and	granted	credit	to	certain	sectors	of	the	manufacturers.	
In	contrast,	the	agricultural	sector	became	a	platform	to	sustain	the	industrialization,	it	
was	 used	 to	 generate	 resources	 for	 welfare	 programs	 and	 protected	 industries.	
President	 Perón	 lost	 the	 support	 from	 the	 landed	 elite6	 as	 they	 feared	 the	 adopted	
measures	would	be	a	disadvantage	of	their	business	due	to	the	diversion	of	resources	
to	the	industrial	sector.	
																																																						
6	Families	that	conformed	the	concentration	of	landownership	in	the	Pampa	region.	
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At	the	beginning,	the	policy	was	working	and	showing	results,	farm	production	
was	 exceeded	 by	 industrial	 production	 for	 the	 first	 time	 and	 industrial	 products	
constituted	a	20%	of	Argentine	exports.	Also,	between	1943	and	1948,	real	wages	for	
industrial	skilled	workers	rose	by	27%	and	for	unskilled	workers	by	37%.	(Rafael	Di	Tella,	
2001)		
	
It	was	in	the	period	from	1949	to	1952	when	the	picture	got	distorted.	Inflation	
rose	 over	 30%	 and	 industrial	 output	 began	 to	 point	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 economy	
(Rafael	Di	Tella,	2001).	The	President	responded	with	austerity	restrictions	such	as	the	
freezing	of	wages.	Also,	in	order	to	continue	with	his	industrialization	process,	he	had	
no	option	but	to	start	attracting	foreign	investment.					
	
	 Within	a	few	years	after	the	election,	Peron’s	government	started	to	be	more	
and	 more	 totalitarian.	 In	 1953,	 the	 government	 began	 to	 imprison	 opponents	 and	
censored	all	means	of	 the	opposition,	 they	were	systematically	 terrorized.	Education	
took	a	back	seat	and	its	budget	was	used	in	propaganda	activity.	Anti-Peronists	terrorist	
acts	began,	like	the	attack	the	15th	of	April	1953	in	the	Place	of	May.	A	Terrorist	attack	
that	consisted	of	the	detonation	of	two	bombs	while	the	president	was	giving	a	speech	
near	the	location.	In	response	to	the	bombs,	Perón	provoked	supporters	to	burn	down	
several	 buildings	 belonging	 to	 the	 opposition.	 In	 1954,	 Perón	 approved	 a	 Law	 that	
included	the	divorce	and	this	provoked	the	confrontation	with	the	Catholic	Church	that	
had	actively	supported	the	Peronism	until	that	year.		
	
On	September	16,	1955,	the	navy	revolted	with	the	support	of	army	battalions	
in	the	interior.	General	Eduardo	Lonardi	proclaimed	a	“Liberating	Revolution”.	A	military	
junta	in	Buenos	Aires	took	control	of	the	government	on	September	18,	and	Perón	fled	
into	exile	(until	1973).	Lonardi	was	nominated	provisional	president.		
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	 3.2.2. 	Import	substitution	model:	Second	sub-stage	(1955-1976)	
	
In	 this	 time	 span,	 and	 centered	 in	 the	 petrochemical	 and	 metal-mechanical	
complexes,	the	industry	had	its	most	outstanding	performance	becoming	the	engine	of	
economic	growth,	employment	creator	and	accumulating	capital.	Between	1964	and	
1973,	 the	manufacturing	 sector	 enjoyed	 a	 continuous	 growth,	 presenting	 a	 peak	 in	
1969,	where	the	sector	had	an	annual	growth	of	11.55%.	(The	World	Bank	Group)		
	
Within	 this	 period,	 there	 was	 an	 entry	 of	 subsidiaries	 of	 transnational	
corporations.	 These	were	 small	 investments,	 basically	 in	machinery	 and	 equipment,	
aimed	 to	 produce	 the	 essential	 for	 the	 internal	 market.	 Also,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	
oligopolistic	structure	in	the	main	manufacturing	activities.	
These	changes	generated	an	accelerated	technological	development	process	based	in	
the	incorporation	of	the	technologies	from	developed	countries;	for	example,	the	Ford	
production	assembly	line	was	adopted.		
	
	
3.3. Military	dictatorship	and	the	Third	Phase	of	Industrialization	 (1976-1990)	
	
In	 1976	 the	 armed	 forces	 took	over	 the	 government	 as	 inflation	 reached	 the	
incredible	level	of	3,000%	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	2004).	During	this	period,	the	
principal	 aim	 of	 the	 economic	 managers	 was	 to	 brake	 inflationary	 price	 increases,	
improve	 industrial	 productivity,	 and	 promote	 competitive	 potential	 of	 the	Argentine	
exports.	
	
In	1977,	the	Tariff	Reform	Plan	was	implemented,	which	by	eliminating	import	
barriers,	sought	to	enable	the	country	to	enter	more	vigorously	into	world	markets	while	
introducing	healthy	external	competition	to	domestic	production.		
But	military’s	measures	were	not	very	effective	and	lead	to	a	40%	drop	in	real	wages	
from	the	previous	five-year	average	without	appreciable	drop	in	inflation	rate	(Rafael	Di	
Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	2001).	They	also	led	to	a	drop	in	tax	revenues	and	the	Military’s	
imposition	of	taxes	on	agricultural	sector	to	support	the	manufacturing	sector.			
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 In	1979,	the	government	then	changed	to	a	fixed	exchange	rate.	Several	wage,	
price	control	and	fiscal	policies	aimed	to	control	inflation	failed.	Imports	increased	and	
drowned	local	industries	that	were	left	to	fail.	Foreign	capital	started	to	run	off	and	the	
Peso	experienced	a	series	of	devaluations.	In	the	following	18	months,	the	U.S.	Dollar	
went	up	100%,	there	was	a	20%	average	monthly	inflation,	reduced	activity,	real	wage	
decreases,	drops	 in	 investment	and	the	fiscal	deficit	 reaching	16%	of	GNP.	 (Rafael	Di	
Tela,	2001)	
	
	 The	surprise	invasion	of	the	Falkland-Malvinas	Island	by	the	Argentine	military	in	
1982	gave	way	to	chaos.		Foreign	investor	lost	confidence	in	the	country	and	started	to	
withdraw	their	funds.	Because	of	the	capital	flight,	the	government	could	no	longer	pay	
its	 external	 debt.	 This	 situation	 led	 to	 growing	 uncertainty	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	
withdrawal	of		skilled	workers	and	capital	fleeing	the	country.	
	
	 In	1986,	given	the	difficult	situation	facing	the	county,	Juan	Vital	Sourrouille,	Raúl	
Alfonsín’s	 Minister	 of	 Economy,	 prepared	 an	 economic	 plan	 in	 which	 the	 central	
objective	 was	 to	 develop	 the	 industry	 through	 a	 process	 of	 expansion	 and	
manufacturing	restructuring	based	on	the	growth	of	exports	and	the	internal	productive	
investment.	The	goal	of	the	process	was	the	transformation	of	the	industrial	structure	
towards	a	model	specialized	in	international	trade,	as	in	the	past	the	external	markets	
were	to	sop	the	contraction	of	local	demand.	Vital	recognized	than	in	order	to	achieve	
its	 objectives	 it	 was	 indispensable	 to	 modernize	 the	 industry	 and	 incorporate	 new	
technologies.		
	
	 His	main	measures	were:	
• Export	promotion.	
• Tariff	protection	and	selective	import	substitution.	
• Industrial	restructuring.		
• Industrial	promotion	and	regional	development.		
• Technological	development.	
• Promotion	of	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises.	
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	 3.4. Convertibility	and	“De-industrialization”	(1990-2002)	 	
	
In	1991,	the	Convertibility	Plan	was	launched.	As	an	attempt	to	control	inflation,	
it	pegged	the	local	currency	at	a	fixed	exchange	rate	of	1	to	the	U.S.	dollar,	at	which	the	
Central	Bank	was	obligated	to	convert	currency	 (it	will	be	more	detailed	 further	on).	
These	new	policies	achieved	economic	stability	with	low	inflation,	it	fell	from	1,344%	in	
1990	 to	84%	 in	1991,	and	 to	 international	 levels	by	1992.	 Foreign	 investments	were	
attracted	producing	a	GDP	growth	but,	in	contrast,	industrial	participation	rate	in	GDP	
declined.	 For	 instance,	 between	 1995	 and	 1999,	 while	 Argentine	 GDP	 increased	 an	
82.55%,	 its	 industrial	 participation	 decreased	 from	 21.29%	 to	 19.2%,	 respectively.		
Economic	 stability	 generated	an	atmosphere	 in	 the	Argentine	population	of	welfare,	
which	many	Argentines	 interpreted	as	 a	disincentive	 to	work,	because	of	 this,	many	
factories	and	industrial	establishments	were	closed.	Industries	also	broke	because	of	the	
cheap	products	that	were	being	imported	from	China.	(Rafael	Di	Tela,	2001)	
	 	
The	economic	policy	under	the	Convertibility	plan	believed	on	the	self-regulation	
of	the	market.	Accordingly,	barriers	to	trade	were	removed	(export	taxes,	import	duties	
and	most	quantitative	restrictions)	and	the	free	flow	of	cross-border	capital	lead	to	the	
opening	of	the	Argentine	economy.	The	government	encouraged	the	entry	of	foreign	
firms	 into	 the	 market	 as	 it	 allowed	 free	 entry	 and	 exit	 of	 portfolio	 capital	 and	
investments.		
	
Foreign	competition,	a	result	of	the	indiscriminate	opening	of	imports,	a	change	
in	relative	prices	resulting	from	the	application	of	1	to	1	parity	against	the	dollar	and	the	
modifications	in	tariffs	led	to	the	destruction	of	large	sectors	of	the	industry	that	were	
not	able	to	compete	with	import	prices,	specially	the	textile.	
	
The	rapid	pace	of	the	Convertibility	Plan	came	to	an	end	with	the	Tequila	crisis7	
that	took	place	in	Mexico,	1995,	and	caused	massive	withdrawals	of	bank	deposits.	Bank	
																																																						
7	The	Tequila	crisis	was	triggered	by	the	lack	of	international	reserves	in	Mexico.	This	led	to	the	devaluation	of	the	
peso	that	caused	effects	such	as	inflation,	high	interest	rates,	economic	activity	collapse,	local	and	foreign	currency	
debt	 services	 increased	and	banks	 collapsed.	The	price	of	 the	dollar	 increased	nearly	300%	 immediately,	 causing	
bankruptcies	of	thousands	of	companies,	unemployment	and	many	debtors	were	prevented	from	paying	their	debts.	
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deposits	which	had	grown	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	57%	between	1991	and	1994,	
declined	at	an	annual	rate	of	62%	in	the	first	three	months	of	1995	(Martin	Uribe,	1996).	
Banks	had	to	stop	new	loans	in	order	to	fulfill	its	depositors’	withdrawals	and	entered	a	
liquidity	crisis	that	led	to	a	rise	in	interest	rates.	Argentina	received	an	emergency	loan	
from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	to	put	an	end	to	the	situation.	
	
In	1999,	Fernando	De	la	Rúa	won	the	elections.	His	mandate	was	marked	by	a	
rapid	economic	deterioration.	Unemployment,	a	result	of	the	deindustrialization	rose	to	
19%	 (La	 Nación,	 1999),	 factories	 remained	 closed	 and	 companies	 continued	 to	 fail.	
Starting	 in	 2000,	 industrial	 activity	 began	 to	 fail	 and	 so	 did	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	
country’s	GDP.	De	 la	Rúa	resigned	on	December	21,	2001,	and	 for	 the	 following	two	
weeks,	Argentina	was	ruled	by	seven	different	presidents.	 	On	Januay	2002,	Eduardo	
Duhalde	was	chosen	President	and	just	one	day	after	his	election,	Argentina	declared	its	
default	when	it	was	not	able	to	pay	a	lira-denominated	bond	of	US$28	million.	
	
3.5. Kirchnerism	(2003-2015)	
	
The	Kirchnerism	is	a	Peronist	political	movement,	founded	in	2003,	which	brings	
together	 the	main	 ideological	 postulates	 embodied	 in	 the	 governments	 of	 President	
Néstor	Kirchner	(2003-2007)	and	Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	(2007-2015).		
	
3.5.1. 	Presidency	of	Néstor	Kirchner	(2003-2007)	
	
The	period	of	2003-2007	was	a	stage	of	great	advance	of	the	Argentine	economy,	
recording	 positive	 rates	 of	 annual	 growth	 throughout	 the	 years.	 Productive	
performance	was	energized	due	to	the	improvement	in	private	domestic	expenditure	
(consumption	and	investment)	and	exports.			
	
On	May	25,	2003,	President	Néstor	Kirchner	took	over	as	president	when	the	
country	was	 still	 suffering	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	 serious	 economic	 and	 social	 crisis	
triggered	by	the	2001	default.	In	the	middle	of	the	year,	almost	60%	of	the	population	
lived	 below	 the	 official	 poverty	 line,	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 stood	 at	 17.4%	 and	
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	 production	 was	 paralyzed	 (The	 World	 Bank	 Group).	 	 Kirchner	 initiated	 a	
government	that	had	as	protagonist	the	public	sector.	Positioning	himself	as	“Man	of	
the	People”,	he	tried	to	maintain	peaceful	relations	with	the	poorest	sectors	of	society8.	
When	President	Kirchner	took	the	office,	the	richest	10%	of	the	population	accounted	
for	39.3%	of	the	national	 income,	and	only	0.7%	was	 left	to	the	poorest	10%.	(Pierre	
Salama,	2012)	
	
By	the	end	of	2003,	the	economic	recovery	that	was	meant	to	be	progressive	
turned	 into	 a	 boom,	while	 economic	 analyst	 expected	 a	 growth	 of	 only	 2%	 in	 2003	
(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015),	the	economy	grew	at	8.8%	(The	World	Bank	
Group).	This	outstanding	behavior	was	due	to	two	causes.	On	the	one	hand,	the	growth	
of	commodity	prices,	whose	index9	experienced	the	first	upward	trend	since	hitting	its	
lowest	level	in	the	second	quarter	of	2002.		On	the	other	hand,	the	restoration	of	public	
confidence	 was	 very	 important.	 President	 Kirchner	 promoted	 people’s	 trust	 by	
announcing	a	50%	increase	in	the	minimum	wage	(paid	by	both	the	private	sector	and	
the	government)	and	by	reopening	the	cases	against	the	previous	military	leader	which	
had	 committed	 human	 right	 violations	 during	 their	 mandate.	 (Rafael	 Di	 Tela	 and	
Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	
	
In	2004,	Argentina	kept	on	growing	and	fiscal	revenues	continued	to	increase.	
The	government	was	being	managed	effectively	and	achieved	a	budget	surplus	 from	
2.3%	of	GDP	in	2003	to	3.9%	in	2004.		The	government	increased	export	taxes,	not	only	
to	benefit	 from	 its	 collection,	but	 to	 keep	 inflation	 stable.	 Lowering	 the	net	price	of	
exports	 would	make	 goods	more	 accessible	 to	 domestic	 buyers.	 Taxes	 of	 unrefined	
petroleum	were	 set	 at	 25%,	 grain	 and	 soy	 items	 at	 20%	 and	milk	 products	 at	 15%	
amongst	others.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015)	
	
	
																																																						
8	For	instance,	he	continued	with	Duhalde’s	Heads	of	Household	program,	“El	plan	de	jefes	y	jefas	de	hogar”,	by	which	
an	economic	help	was	granted	to	families	with	a	kid	under	18	years	old	or	a	kid	with	a	disability.	
9	Index	of	Commodity	prices:	an	index	that	tracks	a	basket	of	commodities	to	measure	their	performance.	In	this	case,	
the	 index	 includes	 the	prices	of	 the	most	 important	commodities	 for	Argentine	exports:	maize,	wheat,	 soybeans,	
soybean	oil,	soybean	meal,	beef,	crude	oil,	metals,	primary	aluminum	and	copper.	
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On	November	5,	2005,	President	Néstor	Kirchner	participated	in	the	refusal	to	
the	 Free	 Trade	Area	 of	 the	Americas	 (FTAA),	 led	 by	U.S.	 President	George	W.	 Bush,	
known	as	“No	to	the	FTAA”.	The	FTAA	proposed	the	creation	of	a	free	trade	zone	from	
Alaska	 to	 Tierra	 del	 Fuego,	 with	 the	 elimination	 of	 tariff	 barriers,	 liberalization	 of	
services,	intra-zone	foreign	investment	protection	agreements,	and	limitation	of	state	
capacity	to	guide	public	procurement.	It	would	have	been	the	largest	free	trade	area	in	
the	world,	with	a	market	of	nearly	800	million	people,	with	a	very	favorable	framework	
for	 the	United	States,	which	was	 the	country	pushing	 for	 its	 formation.	Some	of	 the	
reasons	 for	 Nestor’s	 opposition	 and	 that	 affected	 the	 manufacturing	 sector	 are	 as	
follows:	
• The	effects	of	the	free	importation	of	goods	threaten	to	condemn	the	local	
industrial	 sector	 to	 a	 complete	 disappearance,	 thus	 deepening	 the	 high	
unemployment	rates	that	had	already	punished	the	country	years	before.	
• The	elimination	of	tariff	barriers,	the	prohibition	of	any	state	policy	aimed	at	
favoring	the	use	of	national	goods	or	privileging	in	any	way	local	or	sectorial	
development,	 among	 other	 things,	 threaten	 abolish	 medium	 and	 small	
companies	as	well	as	to	promote	the	deindustrialization	of	the	economy.	
	
Because	 in	 the	 years	 prior	 to	 2005	 the	 economy	 had	 experienced	 a	 very	
accelerated	growth	rate,	almost	eliminating	the	difference	between	capacity	and	usage	
(the	 “output	 gap”)10,	 Argentina’s	 inflation	 accelerated	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 December	
2005,	it	had	reached	11%.	(The	World	Bank	Group)	
During	 2006	 and	 2007,	 growth	 in	 the	 manufacturing	 sector	 continued,	
presenting	an	annual	growth	of	9.1%	in	2006	and	of	7.53%	in	2007.	(The	World	Bank	
Group)	
	
In	 2007,	 Nestor	 contributed	 to	 the	 Latin	 American	 unity	 and	 integration	 by	
promoting	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Union	 of	 South	 American	 Nations	 (UNASUR).	 It	 is	 an	
international	organization	that	aims	to	build	a	South	American	identity	and	citizenship,	
																																																						
10	 Difference	 between	 the	 actual	 output	 of	 an	 economy	 and	 the	 maximum	 potential	 output	 of	 the	 economy,	
expressed	as	a	percentage	of	Gross	Domestic	Product.	
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	 as	well	 as	 to	 develop	 an	 integrated	 regional	 space.	 It	 is	 formed	 by	 the	 twelve	
independent	states	of	South	America11.	
	
3.5.2. Presidency	of	Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	(2007-2015)	
	
At	 the	 end	 of	 his	 term,	Nestor	 Kirchner	was	 a	 respected	man,	 known	 for	 his	
commitment	to	Argentina	and	his	actions,	which	had	managed	to	get	Argentina	forward.	
Because	 the	 Argentine	 Constitution	 does	 not	 allow	 a	 president	 to	 return	 to	 being	 a	
candidate	if	he	has	already	had	the	mandate	for	two	consecutive	terms12,	the	Kirchners	
decided	for	Cristina	to	run	to	preserve	the	ability	of	Nestor	to	run	again	in	the	future	
without	restriction.	Thus,	the	turn	of	Cristina	Fernandez	de	Kirchner	arrived	on	October	
28,	2007,	after	the	four	years	of	mandate	of	her	husband.		
	
One	of	the	first	measures	of	Cristina	Kirchner	was	the	creation	of	the	Ministry	of	
Science,	Technology	and	Productive	Innovation.	It	was	created	in	December	2007	and	
its	mission	was	to	guide	science,	 technology	and	 innovation	towards	strengthening	a	
new	 production	 model	 that	 generated	 greater	 social	 inclusion	 and	 improved	 the	
competitiveness	of	Argentinian	economy.	
	
The	government	was	soon	shaken	by	major	commotions.	First,	the	conflict	with	
the	countryside	that	took	place	in	March	2008	and	that	has	already	been	explained	in	
the	2.1.1	Agriculture	sector.	Second,	the	international	crisis	in	the	second	half	of	2008	
and	most	of	200913.		
	
The	crisis	began	to	impact	Argentina	at	a	very	bad	moment,	due	to	the	severe	
drought	that	affected	the	country	with	production	losses	in	key	export	sectors14	and	to	
the	 internal	 instability	provoked	by	 the	previous	 stated	 conflict	between	agricultural	
																																																						
11	Brazil,	Argentina,	Colombia,	Venezuela,	Chile,	Perú,	Ecuador,	Uruguay,	Bolivia,	Paraguay,	Surinam	and	Guyana.	
12	However,	if	only	one	is	served,	he	can	opt	for	the	office	as	many	times	as	he	wants	
13	The	financial	crisis	of	2008	was	directly	triggered	by	the	collapse	of	the	housing	bubble	in	the	United	States	in	2006,	
which	triggered	the	so-called	subprime	mortgage	crisis	 in	October	2007.	The	repercussions	of	the	mortgage	crisis	
began	 to	 manifest	 extremely	 seriously	 since	 early	 2008,	 first	 infecting	 the	 US	 financial	 system	 and	 then	 the	
international	financial	system,	resulting	in	a	deep	liquidity	crisis,	and	indirectly	causing	other	economic	phenomena	
such	 the	stock	market	crash	of	 January	2008	and	 the	global	 stock	market	crash	of	October	2008	and,	overall,	an	
international	economic	crisis.	
14	Explained	in	2.1.1	Agriculture	sector.	
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based	regions	versus	Cristina	Kirchner’s	government.	 	 In	these	years,	Argentina	came	
back	 to	 live	on	 the	 savings	and	 the	external	production.	 From	 there,	 it	 continued	 to	
deepen,	becoming	not	only	a	flight	of	capital,	which	would	rise	to	$10.9	billion	(Lucía	
Gallo,	2010),	but	a	great	difficulty	in	importing	all	the	necessary	products.	For	example,	
merchandise	imports	declined	from	$57.46	billion	to	$38.79	billion	in	2008	and	2009,	
respectively.	(The	World	Bank	Group)	
	
Given	the	necessity	to	address	the	crisis	in	such	conditions,	Argentina	developed	
an	“Anticrisis	Plan”	in	November	2008.	The	plan	was	based	on	a	series	of	fiscal	measures	
to	 promote	 investment	 and	 employment	 through	 public	 spending.	 For	 example,	
benefits	 for	 those	 who	 brought	 their	 capital	 from	 abroad	 to	 invest	 locally	 in	
infrastructure	or	the	ambitious	$21	billion	public	works	plan	to	sustain	the	economy	and	
double	the	number	of	jobs	in	the	sector.	However,	the	lack	of	consumer	confidence	lead	
to	 a	 decrease	 in	 domestic	 spending	 57.48%	 of	 GDP	 (The	World	 Bank	Group),	which	
normally	accounted	for	more	than	65%	of	GDP.	This	raised	doubts	about	the	plan	as	
some	believed	that	the	problem	was	not	the	public	spending	but	the	private	spending’s	
contraction.	Argentina	was	facing	a	situation	in	which	most	of	the	economist	started	to	
think	 that	 zero	 growth	 was	 an	 optimistic	 number	 of	 growth	 rate	 given	 the	
circumstances.	(Damián	Wroclavsky,	2008)	
	
	 Another	example	of	measure	was	the	“Argentina	Trabaja”	program,	launched	in	
2009.	 It	was	created	under	 the	motto	“Es	Argentina	 trabaja,	no	Argentina	descansa”	
(Argentina	works,	 It	does	not	 rest)	and	 it	was	a	plan	to	generate	employment	 in	 the	
more	 depressed	 neighborhoods	 and	 to	 carry	 out	 basic	 infrastructure	 works	 in	
municipalities.	 The	 program	 involved	 approximately	 150,000	 workers.	 (Sandra	
Guimenez,	2011)		
	
Thanks	to	mix	of	the	new	policies	and	institutions,	Argentina	gradually	overcame	
the	crisis	increasing	the	total	GDP	by	27%	in	2009	of	$334.49	billion	to	$425.92	billion	in	
2010,	according	to	The	World	Bank	Group.		
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	 In	October	2010	Néstor	Kirchner	died	from	a	heart	attack	and	the	couple’s	plan	to	
take	 turns	 faded	 away.	 Presidential	 election	 took	 place	 in	 December	 2010	 and	 the	
country,	 supporting	 the	 grieving	 widow,	 chose	 Cristina	 Fernández	 again	 as	 their	
President.		
	
The	years	2010	and	2011	presented	very	alike	situations	in	economic	terms.	After	
the	recession	in	2009,	Argentina	grew	similarly	in	2010	and	2011,	with	an	increase	of	
27%	and	26%	respectively	(increase	calculated	with	data	provided	by	The	World	Bank	
Data).	 Most	 manufacturing	 sectors	 regained	 pre-crisis	 activity	 levels.	 Basic	 metal	
manufacturing	expanded	22%	and	textile	production,	15%	(CEPAL,	2011).	 In	contrast,	
petroleum	refining	and	paper	and	paperboard	were	examples	of	segments	of	industry	
that	did	not	experience	growth	at	all	or	failed	to	recover	pre-crisis	levels.	
	
Just	 a	 week	 after	 the	 President	 was	 reelected,	 she	 announced	 a	 series	 of	
currency	controls	aimed	to	stem	capital	 flight	and	preserve	 the	Central	Bank’s	dollar	
reserves.	 The	 established	 currency	 controls	 limited	 the	 power	 to	 buy	 or	 sell	 foreign	
currencies,	 especially	 American	 dollars.	 This	 drove	 many	 Argentines	 to	 keep	 their	
savings	 in	dollars	as	a	hedge	against	 inflation.	Because	the	rules	seemed	unclear	and	
opaque	and	their	implantation	was	onerous,	many	currency-exchange	houses	closed.		
	
In	 June	2010,	 the	President	 announced	 the	Bicentennial	 Productive	 Financing	
Program,	with	the	aim	of	financing	productive	investments	that	generated	employment,	
substituting	 imports,	 encouraging	 regional	 development	 and	 increasing	 exports	 and	
competitiveness.	She	ensured	that	10,000	million	pesos	would	be	invested	for	SMEs	and	
large	companies.	(Télam,	2014)		
	
In	 October	 2011,	 access	 to	 dollars	 became	 more	 complicated	 due	 to	 the	
introduction	of	more	restrictions	by	the	government.	The	President	implemented	the	
“Cepo	Cambiario”	in	November	2011,	a	measure	that	restricted	the	sale	of	dollars	in	the	
country.	Also,	purchases	made	abroad	with	credit	cards	payed	an	additional	15%.	These	
restrictions	also	had	an	impact	on	the	real	state	sector,	where	transactions	declined	a	
34%	in	the	first	seven	months	of	2013.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015)	
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Commodity	 prices	 experienced	 a	 drop	 during	 2014	 and	 consequently,	
Argentina’s	income	from	exports	was	reduced	by	$4.5	billion	relative	to	2013	(Rafael	Di	
Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	Modifications	regarding	 laws	of	 industrial	products	
also	 took	 place.	 Some	 sectors	 experienced	 advantageous	 reforms,	 such	 as	 the	
automotive	industries	whose	quota	was	increased.	In	contrast,	other	sectors	were	less	
favored.	However,	what	these	industries	had	in	common	was	the	government	began	to	
require	them	to	report	excessive	information	about	their	transactions.	Now,	companies	
not	only	had	to	provide	annual	projections	in	dollars	of	exports	and	imports,	but	also	
had	to	present	information	on	sales,	financing,	investment	projects	and	profile	of	the	
company	and	the	workforce,	among	others.	This	requirement	increased	pressure	from	
the	government	to	the	companies.		
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	 4. BANKING	AND	FINANCE	
	
	
	 Before	 explaining	 the	 main	 events	 that	 marked	 the	 history	 of	 banking	 and	
finance	in	Argentina,	it	is	important	to	elaborate	on	the	oil	crisis	that	took	place	in	1973	
and	 consequences	 of	 it	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Argentina's	 financial	 sector	 and	 its	
external	debt.	
	
As	its	name	suggests,	the	oil	crisis	of	1973	began	on	October	16,	1973,	following	
the	 decision	 of	 the	OPEC	 and	Organization	 of	 Arab	 Petroleum	 Exporting	 Countries15	
(OAPEC)	to	embargo	oil	exports	to	countries	that	had	supported	Israel	during	the	Yom	
Kippur	war	between	Israel	against	Syria	and	Egypt.	The	embargo	included	the	United	
States	 and	 its	 Western	 European	 allies,	 industrialized	 countries	 that	 were	 heavily	
dependent	on	oil	export	from	Arab	oil	producers.	OPEC	members	also	began	a	series	of	
production	cuts	that	led	to	an	increase	of	the	world	price	of	oil.	In	1973,	the	price	of	the	
barrel	 increased	from	$3.5	to	$5.5	 (Miguel	García	and	Gerardo	Ronquillo,	2005),	and	
reached	$11.56	a	barrel	 in	January	1974	(Michael	Corbett,	2013).	 	The	increase	of	oil	
prices	 generated	 inflationary	 spiral	 and	 lower	 production	 in	 oil	 importing	 countries.	
Most	 of	 the	 importing	 countries	 reacted	 with	 austerity	 policies,	 reducing	 public	
spending	and	fomenting	savings.	In	contrast,	countries	of	the	Middle	East	took	control	
of	a	commodity	and	soon	began	 to	accumulate	an	enormous	hoard	of	cash	 that	 the	
press	referred	to	as	petrodollars.		
	
In	 March	 1974,	 the	 embargo	 was	 lifted	 but,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 explained,	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 crisis	 spread	 throughout	 the	 world	 until	 1980s.	 Although	 the	
embargo	was	not	directly	applied	to	Argentina,	due	to	its	relationship	of	dependence	
with	the	affected	countries,	it	was	also	influenced.	
	
	
	
																																																						
15	At	the	time,	the	OAPEC	included	Saudi	Arabia,	Algeria,	Bahrain,	Egypt,	Syria,	Tunisia,	United	Arab	Emirates,	Iraq,	
Kuwait,	Libya	and	Qatar.	
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4.1. The	military	dictatorship	(1976-1983)	
	
Argentina’s	financial	system	was	exposed	to	numerous	changes	during	the	1976-
1983	period.	 The	economy’s	uneven	patterns	of	 growth	and	 the	 frequent	 change	of	
governments	 gave	 rise	 to	 pronounced	 shifts	 in	 financial	 policy.	 During	 this	 period,	
Argentina	had	seven	different	ministers	of	economy.	
	
As	 it	 has	 previously	 been	 mentioned	 in	 other	 Sections,	 beginning	 in	 1976	
Argentina	was	ruled	by	a	military	dictatorship.	The	coup,	that	took	place	in	March	24,	
1976,	was	a	response	to	the	economic	chaos	that	Argentina	was	experiencing	the	prior	
year,	1975.	The	country	was	marked	by	a	public	deficit	that	reached	a	17%	of	its	total	
GDP,	there	was	a	critical	situation	in	its	balance	of	payments,	an	external	debt	of	$10	
billion	and	an	annual	inflation	that	exceeded	400%	(Noel	Maurer	and	Aldo	Musacchio,	
2006).	
	
To	 end	 this	 situation,	 especially	 the	 high	 inflation,	 the	 military	 left	 the	
management	of	the	economy	in	the	hands	of	Alfredo	Martínez	de	Hoz,	who	served	as	
Minister	of	Economy	until	March	29,	1981.		
	
4.1.1. The	Financial	Reform	of	1977	
	
Martínez	de	Hoz	and	his	team	thought	that	until	then	the	government	had	had	
a	 very	 interventionist	 behavior:	 regulating	 economic	 activities,	 arbitrating	 labor	
relations,	favoring	the	business	sector	through	preferential	tariffs	and	subsidies…They	
blamed	this	type	of	practice	of	having	caused	such	a	high	inflation.	Hence	they	adopted	
the	political-economic	theory	of	the	neo-liberalism,	which	was	based	on	the	limitation	
of	the	state’s	intervention	in	legal	and	economic	matters.	
	
Accordingly,	they	announced	the	Financial	Reform	of	1977,	a	policy	of	financial	
liberalization	more	 focused	 on	 deregulating	 than	 regulating.	 Its	 aim	was	 to	 create	 a	
capital	 market	 that	 would	 appeal	 to	 foreign	 investors	 to	 reactivate	 the	 Argentine	
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	 economy.	Also,	Martínez	de	Hoz	thought	that	increased	exposure	to	domestic	and	
foreign	competition	could	foster	the	overall	efficiency	of	the	economy.	
	
Measures	of	this	reform	were:	
• Interest	 rates	 were	 freed	 and	 left	 to	 be	 defined	 through	 supply	 and	
demand,	resulting	in	high	interest	rates,		
• control	of	public	expenditure,	
• Freezing	of	workers’	wages,	
• 	restrictions	on	international	capital	movements	were	eliminated,		
• and	 financial	 institutions	 were	 given	 complete	 freedom	 to	 expand	
geographically	and	open	new	branches.	
	
The	Reform	1977	wanted	to	stop	manufacturing	from	being	the	sole	core	activity	
of	the	economy	and,	instead,	tried	to	facilitate	the	shift	from	industry	to	finance.	
	
Indeed,	Martínez	de	Hoz’s	reform	was	reactivating	the	Argentine	economy.	That	
year,	total	GDP	had	an	annual	growth	of	6.934%	(The	World	Bank	Group)	and	exports	
experienced	a	growth	of	50.7%,	reaching	$5,610	million,	according	to	the	BCRA.	This	
favorable	evolution	in	exports	was	basically	caused	by	the	change	in	trade	policy	as	the	
disincentives	for	exports	were	taken	out.	In	contrast,	imports	remained	relatively	flat	at	
$4,100	million.	Thus,	the	balance	of	payments	reacted	in	a	favorable	way,	closing	the	
year	with	a	surplus	of	$1,510	million	(Guillermo	O’Donnel,	2008).		
	
At	the	same	time,	the	world	was	undergoing	the	consequences	of	the	oil	crisis	
caused	by	the	previously	mentioned	conflict	between	the	oil-exporting	countries	and	
the	United	States	and	its	allies.	By	this	time	the	embargo	had	already	been	lifted	and	
the	increase	in	the	price	of	the	oil	barrels	continued.	In	1977,	the	price	of	a	barrel	of	
crude	was	of	$14.40	(Tim	McMahon,	2015).	Thus,	oil-exporting	countries	had	significant	
surpluses	of	petrodollars	(it	is	calculated	that	by	1980	the	surplus	was	of	approximately	
$90	billion	 (Pierre	Terzian,	2017))	 that	were	channeled	by	 the	banks	 to	oil-importing	
countries,	especially	to	banks	in	the	United	States,	Japan	and	Europe.	Martínez	de	Hoz’s	
model	 of	 open	 economy	 encouraged	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 sectors	 to	 borrow	
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heavily	 in	 these	 international	 financial	 markets.	 Moreover,	 foreign	 currency-
denominated	loans	were	extremely	attractive	as	they	could	be	acquired	with	a	very	low	
interest	rate,	of	approximately	4%.		
	
The	 public	 sector	 used	 these	 loans	 to	 make	 adjustments	 in	 the	 balance	 of	
payments	and	increase	the	reserves	of	the	Central	Bank,	which	at	the	end	of	the	year	
reached	$4.048	million,	a	considerably	larger	amount	than	the	$1,812	million	at	the	end	
of	1976	 (Guillermo	O’Donnel,2008).	The	economy	was	expanded	with	external	 funds	
coupled	with	large	public	expenditures.	The	total	public	debt	in	1978	equaled	$8,127	
million.	(Mario	Rapoport,	2017)	
	
As	for	the	private	sector,	the	money	obtained	from	its	debt	overseas	was	not	all	
used	 to	 fund	 production	 expansion.	 	 A	 large	 portion	 was	 directed	 to	 financial	
speculation.	Companies	preferred	to	borrow	money	abroad	at	a	low	interest	rate	and	
then	invest	in	pesos	in	Argentina	where	local	interest	rates	were	exaggeratedly	high.	In	
October	1977,	 they	 reached	135%	 (Rio	Negro	Diary).	At	 the	end	of	 the	year,	private	
external	debt	of	$3,635	million.	(Mario	Rapoport,	2017).	
	
The	massive	indebtedness	of	the	Argentine	state	was	justified	by	the	economic	
leaders	of	the	dictatorship	and	by	the	IMF,	as	a	way	to	increase	their	reserves	in	foreign	
currency	to	support	a	policy	of	economic	opening.	The	IMF's	support	allowed	Argentina	
to	improve	its	international	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	the	main	industrialized	countries,	
especially	the	United	States.	
	
	Despite	all	the	achievements	the	Reform	had,	it	did	not	meet	its	main	objective,	
which	was	reducing	the	inflation	to	normal	levels.	Although	inflation	rate	decreased	to	
176%	in	1977	from	443.97%	in	comparison	to	the	previous	year,	 it	was	still	high	and	
sporadic.	(The	World	Bank	Group)	
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	 4.1.2. La	Tablita	Cambiaria,	1978	
	
Martínez	de	Hoz’s	commitment	to	stabilize	the	inflation	was	very	strong	and,	in	
1978,	 he	 did	 another	 attempt	 and	 proposed	 a	 measure	 to	 solve	 the	 problem,	 the	
“Tablita”.	It	consisted	of	a	programmed	devaluation	of	the	peso	based	on	a	conversion	
table	(“tablita”)	that	tended	to	a	stable	exchange	rate	in	the	near	future,	it	contained	
the	devaluations	from	January,	1978	to	August,	1979.	
	
What	 Martínez	 de	 Hoz	 did	 not	 expect	 was	 the	 speculative	 capitals	 taking	
advantage	 of	 the	 known	 exchange	 rates.	 What	 happened	 was	 that,	 once	 again,	
companies	made	money	 from	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 interest	 rates.	 Foreign	 currency	
debts	were	converted	into	pesos	to	be	deposited	in	the	short	term	in	Argentina.	Once	
the	interest	had	been	obtained,	and	thanks	to	the	overvaluation	of	the	currency,	the	
conversion	to	dollars	was	then	made	to	transfer	the	funds.	The	difference	was	that,	this	
time,	thanks	to	the	“Tablita”,	companies	knew	when	the	next	devaluation	was	going	to	
happen	and	of	how	much	it	was	going	to	be,	so	they	took	the	obtained	surplus	abroad	
before	the	new	devaluation	occurred.	This	form	of	speculation	received	the	name	of	the	
“bicicleta	 financiera”	 (“financial	bicycle”)	and	 the	period	was	known	as	“plata	dulce”	
(“sweet	money”),	referring	to	the	easy	way	of	making	money.	The	motto	“deme	dos”	
(“give	me	two”)	became	typical	of	the	time.	It	was	the	phrase	used	by	the	middle-class	
Argentines	when	they	began	to	travel	abroad	and	started	buying	things	in	pairs.		
	
All	 in	 all,	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	measure	 caused	 financial	 savings	 being	
primarily	in	the	form	of	short-term	deposits	with	a	maturity	of	30	days	or	less,	private	
sector	firms	becoming	highly	indebted	in	terms	of	both	peso	and	the	United	States	dollar	
and	a	constant	leakage	of	capital.	It	only	managed	to	decrease	inflation	by	less	than	ten	
percent,	 but	 annual	 inflation	was	 still	 higher	 than	 a	 100%.	 Also,	 there	was	 shocking	
increase	in	private	external	debt	of	110%,	reaching	$9,074	million	in	1979.	Public	debt	
also	increased	but	in	a	more	moderate	way;	it	grew	nearly	a	20%	(Guillermo	O’Donnel,	
2008).	
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In	 1979,	 once	 the	 eight	months	 of	 the	 “Tablita”	 were	 over,	 the	 government	
shifted	to	a	fixed	nominal	exchange	rate	as	well	as	introduced	various	fiscal	policies	and	
wage	 controls	designed	 to	 contain	 inflation	 that	 failed.	 Thus,	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate	
appreciated	rapidly	appreciated	and	left	the	peso	seriously	overvalued.	In	consequence,	
imports	 increased	 and	 local	 industries	 were	 left	 to	 fail.	 The	 situation	 became	
unsustainable.	
	
4.2. From	the	Military	dictatorship	to	Alfonsín	
	
	 The	 late	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s	 was	 a	 difficult	 period	 for	 the	 international	
financial	markets.	Real	interest	rates	were	high	and	most	industrial	countries	were	in	
deep	recessions.	In	the	United	States,	the	Federal	Reserve	increased	the	interest	rates			
International	credit	became	expensive	and	scarce	for	Argentina,	making	 it	difficult	to	
obtain	funds	and	facing	the	payment	of	higher	interests.	Thus,	capital	flight	increased,	
and	foreign	reserves	decreased	by	more	than	$2	billion	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	
2001).	
	
	 Roberto	 Eduardo	 Viola	 became	 president	 on	 March	 29,	 1981.	 	 Under	 his	
presidency,	there	were	five	Ministers	of	Economy	was	distributed	as	Viola	did	not	want	
to	 put	 someone	 powerful	 in	 charge	 of	 that	 portfolio	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 presidential	
authority	being	questioned	or	eroded.	Of	the	five	men	in	charge,	Lorenzo	Sigaut	was	the	
one	 who	 stood	 out.	 On	 April	 1,	 1981,	 as	 an	 incentive	 to	 agricultural	 and	 industrial	
production	and	 to	discourage	 speculative	movements	of	 capital,	 Sigaut	announced	a	
30%	devaluation	of	the	peso	against	the	dollar	(Klaus	Friedrich	Veigel,	2009).		He	also	
tried	to	reactivate	the	public	finance	by	stablishing	export	taxes,	raising	public	tariffs,	
and	freezing	the	salaries	of	the	public	employees.	At	the	beginning,	his	program	seemed	
to	be	effective	as	at	the	end	of	April	reserves	had	risen	by	more	than	$1.5	billion	(Klaus	
Friedrich	Veigel,	2009).	However,	the	inflation	continued	at	104.48%.	(The	World	Bank	
Group)	
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	 	 The	 Argentine	 military	 embarked	 upon	 a	 surprise	 invasion	 of	 the	 Falkland-
Malvinas	Islands	on	April	2,	1982,	an	armed	conflict	between	the	Argentine	Republic	and	
the	Great	Britain.	It	did	not	last	long,	by	June	14,	1982,	the	U.K.	had	quickly	repelled	the	
assault.	However,	 it	 disturbed	 the	Argentine	 economy	as	 foreign	 investors	 lost	 even	
more	 confidence	 in	 the	 country	 and	 withdrew	 their	 funds.	 Consequently,	 the	
government	had	to	suspend	payments	on	its	external	debt	and	the	private	foreign	debt	
ran	out	of	external	source	of	refinancing.	Bankruptcy	of	large	parts	of	the	private	sector	
was	just	around	the	corner.		
	
	 The	administration	that	took	over	in	June	1982,	under	the	mandate	of	Reynaldo	
Benito	 Bignone,	 found	 the	 Argentine	 economy	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 abyss.	 A	 severe	
financial	and	foreign	exchange	crisis	about	to	explode,	a	growing	public	sector	deficit	
that	caused	a	 rising	 inflation	and	the	consequences	of	 the	Falkland-Malvinas	 Islands’	
war.	To	address	the	situation,	the	then	President	of	the	Central	Bank,	Doming	Cavallo,	
introduced	 a	 financial	 reform	 that	 refinanced	 the	 peso	 indebtedness	 of	 the	 private	
sector	on	a	long-term	basis	at	reduced	interest	rates,	promoted	medium-term	and	long-
term	savings,	and	attempted	to	improve	the	overall	efficiency	of	the	banking	system.	
Also,	the	government	increased	the	legal	reserve	requirement	on	deposits	from	15.5%	
to	100%	in	order	to	 improve	the	Central	bank	control	over	the	money	supply	and	to	
finance	the	private	sector	debt.	(Bernhard	Fischer	and	Peter	Trapp,	1985)	
	
If	1982	had	not	yet	been	a	complicated	year,	in	August	began	the	so-called	“Lost	
decade”	for	Latin	America’s	development,	the	most	traumatic	economic	experience	that	
Latin	 America	 has	 undergone.	 On	 that	 month,	 Mexico	 declared	 the	 temporary	
moratorium	 on	 its	 foreign	 debt.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 several	 countries	 that	were	 also	
experiencing	 difficulties,	 which	 were	 expressed	 in	 arrears	 in	 payments	 and	massive	
outflows	of	 financial	 resources,	were	subject	to	strong	tensions	as	commercial	banks	
reacted	to	Mexico’s	default	by	reducing	new	loans	to	Latin	America.	Because	most	their	
loans	were	short-term,	these	countries	struggled	to	refinance	their	debt	and	soon	had	
to	 suspend	 their	 payments	 threatening	 the	 solvency	 of	 major	 international	 banks,	
especially	American	banks.	This	is	the	case	of	Brazil	and	Argentina.	At	the	end	of	1982,	
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Argentina’s	external	debt	totaled	$40	billion.	(Rafael	Di	Tela,	Tarun	Khana	and	Huw	Pill,	
2003).			
	
4.3. Raúl	Alfonsín’s	financial	policy:	The	Austral	Plan	(1983-1989)	
 
	 Following	 the	disastrous	defeat	 in	 the	Malvinas	War,	 the	military	 junta	 called	
elections	and	Raúl	Alfonsín	became	president	on	December	10,	1983.	By	then,	Argentina	
was	facing	a	series	difficulties	were:	
• Inflation,	which	was	of	approximately	343.81%	(The	World	Bank	Group),	
• The	public	debt,	which	was	of	$45,079	millions	(Carlos	Alfredo	Rodríguez,	
1989).	
• a	 fiscal	 deficit	 that	 represented	 the	 15%	 of	 the	 country’s	 total	 GDP	
(Bernhard	Fischer	and	Peter	Trapp,1985).	
	
Aside	from	internal	difficulties	the	external	factors	did	not	help.	 Interest	rates	
were	 high	 and	 the	 price	 of	 Argentine	 export	 products	 decreased,	 which	meant	 less	
revenue.		
	
The	new	authorities	maintained	the	system	of	 regulated	and	 indexed	 interest	
rates	 on	 medium-term	 and	 long-term	 deposits.	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 small	 financial	
institutions	and	those	 in	 less	developed	regions	from	defaulting,	Alfonsín	established	
less	rigid	lending	limits	and	lowered	the	legal	reserve	requirement.	
	
In	June	1985,	the	government	announced	the	Austral	Plan,	named	after	the	new	
currency	 it	 instituted	 and	 that	 became	 the	 legal	 tender	 of	 the	 country.	 One	 Austral	
equaled	1,000	Argentine	Pesos.	The	main	objective	of	the	plan	was	to	curb	the	rising	
inflation	of	the	1980s,	which	had	climbed	to	uncontrollable	levels,	reaching	a	672.18%	
in	1985,	as	estimated	by	the	World	Bank	Group.	The	plan	involved	structural	reforms	
(cutting	 subsidies	 and	 deregulating	 and	 privatizing	 state	 industries),	 economic	
liberalization	to	control	inflationary	expectations	(reduction	in	protectionist	policies	and	
freezing	wages)	and	debt	renegotiations.	The	program	was	 initially	very	successful	 in	
stopping	inflation.	Inflation	fell	from	672.18%	in	1985	to	90.1%	in	1986.	Unfortunately,	
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	 as	most	stabilization	efforts	 in	Argentina,	 the	Austral	plan	also	failed.	After	one	
year	of	relative	stability,	inflation	rose	again,	reaching	hyperinflation	levels	of	3,079.81%	
in	1989.	(The	World	Bank	Group)	
	
	 	
4.4. The	Convertibility	Plan	(1990-2001)	
	
After	several	years	of	economic	and	financial	difficulties,	the	first	of	April	1991,	
the	Convertibility	Plan	was	enacted.	 	 It	refers	to	the	various	economic	measures	that	
were	taken	by	the	Ministry	of	Economy	of	the	moment,	Domingo	Cavallo,	during	the	
presidency	 of	 Carlos	 Saúl	 Menem,	 who	 became	 president	 on	 July	 1989.	 The	
Convertibility	Plan’s	main	objective	was	to	fight	inflation,	but	it	was	also	concerned	free-
market	reforms	like	elimination	of	wage	and	price	controls	and	trade	liberalization.	
	
The	main	measure,	origin	of	its	name,	fixed	the	peso’s	exchange	rate	at	par	with	
the	U.S.	dollar,	in	this	way	the	conversion	between	the	two	currencies	was	free.	Trying	
to	avoid	inflation	from	increasing,	the	plan	made	it	illegal	for	the	central	bank	to	increase	
the	nation’s	monetary	base	or	issue	credit	unless	it	had	backing	in	U.S.	dollars.	Thus,	the	
State	could	not	be	 financed	by	the	central	bank	anymore,	 it	had	to	 look	 for	external	
capital.	As	part	of	the	Convertibility	plan,	legal	reserve	requirements	of	bank	deposits	in	
local	currency	were	reduced,	while	those	deposits	in	foreign	currency	were	increased,	
trying	to	stimulate	transactions	in	pesos	instead	of	currencies.		
	
With	this	system,	money	supply	became	an	exogenous	variable,	which	means	
that	the	increase	in	the	monetary	base	was	subject	to	foreign	currency	inflows,	it	could	
not	be	controlled	by	economic	policy.	In	this	context,	the	peso	was	transformed	into	a	
voucher	 for	 a	 dollar,	 applied	within	 national	 borders,	 acting	 exclusively	 as	 a	 unit	 of	
account.	The	other	functions	of	money	were	satisfied	by	the	dollar,	as	it	was	also	made	
legal	tender.		
	
In	addition	to	this	major	monetary	overhaul,	the	government	carried	out	a	large	
number	of	privatizations.	Between	1991	and	1994,	about	90%	of	all	state	companies	
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were	privatized	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	Privatizations	were	a	way	
to	 balance	 the	 budget	 as	 public	 enterprises	 were	 generally	 losing	 money	 and	 its	
privatization	 entailed	 reduction	of	 expenditure	 and	 generation	of	 funds.	 In	 addition,	
buyers	had	the	possibility	to	pay	through	debt	securities,	which	reduced	the	external	
public	debt	and	with	it,	future	interests.		
	
	 The	 problem	 of	 the	 Convertibility	 Plan	 was	 that,	 as	 it	 has	 already	 been	
mentioned,	money	to	cover	the	imbalances	could	not	be	issued.	Thus,	the	deficit	led	to	
the	taking	of	new	loans,	which	implied	higher	interest	rates	and,	consequently,	larger	
deficits.	On	April	7,	1992,	Argentina	joined	the	Brady	Plan,	which	was	a	strategy	aimed	
to	 restructure	 the	 debt	 incurred	 by	 developing	 countries	 with	 commercial	 banks,	
especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Latin	 American	 debt	 crisis.	 The	 plan	 allowed	 the	
restructuring	 of	 the	 debt	 with	 private	 banks	 to	 15	 years	 for	 interest	 arrears	 (about	
$8,300	million)	and	30	years	for	principal	(about	$20	billion).	These	restructurings	were	
collateralized	by	zero	coupon	U.S.	Treasury	bonds	that	matched	the	principal	maturities	
of	the	government	debt.			
	
Overall,	during	its	first	years	of	implementation,	the	plan	seemed	to	achieve	its	
immediate	objectives.	The	economy	seemed	to	recover	at	a	 rapid	space.	 (The	World	
Bank	data)	
• Total	GDP	increased	from	$189.72	billion	in	1991	to	$257.44	billion	in	1994,	
an	increase	of	36%.	
• During	the	same	period,	inflation	decreased	from	171.67%	to	4.18%.	
• Foreign	Direct	Investment	(FDI)	in	1990	was	of	approximately	$35	million	and	
in	1994	it	reached	approximately	$1,01	billions.	It	reached	levels	higher	than	
those	of	 the	 rest	of	 Latin	America	and	most	 countries	 in	emerging	world.	
(Index	Mundi)	
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	 4.4.1. First	evidence	of	the	weaknesses	of	the	Convertibility	Plan		
	
As	 the	 Argentine	 economy	 depended	 so	much	 on	 external	 capital,	 problems	
began	to	arise	when	the	international	context	became	more	unfavorable.	The	first	crisis	
that	 hit	 the	 Convertibility	 Plan	 was	 the	 Mexican	 financial	 crisis,	 also	 known	 as	 the	
“Tequila	Crisis”.	On	December	1994,	the	Mexican	Central	bank	ran	out	of	dollars	and	
was	 force	 to	 float	 the	exchange	 rate.	 The	peso	devaluated	 its	 value,	 from	about	5.3	
pesos	per	dollar	to	over	10	pesos	per	dollar	between	December	1994	and	November	
1995	 (Also	 Musacchio,	 2012).	 Foreign	 investors,	 anticipating	 further	 currency	
devaluations,	 began	 to	 withdraw	 capital	 from	 Mexican	 investments.	 To	 discourage	
capital	 flight,	 the	 Mexican	 central	 bank	 increased	 interest	 rates	 but	 only	 ended	
accelerating	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 economy.	 The	 central	 bank	 could	 not	meet	 its	 debt	
obligations	and	let	the	government	facing	an	imminent	sovereign	default.		
	
	
As	 Argentina	 was	 seen	 as	 an	 emerging	 country	 similar	 to	Mexico,	 inevitable	
distrust	was	also	generated.	The	crisis	 caused	a	massive	 reversion	of	 capital	 flows,	a	
sharp	rise	in	interest	rates,	a	collapse	of	the	stock	market	and	a	sacrifice	of	reserves	in	
the	 attempt	 of	 saving	 several	 financial	 entities	 from	 bankruptcy.	 As	 previously	
explained,	because	banks	did	not	have	access	to	emergency	funds	from	the	Central	Bank	
anymore,	the	capital	flight	resulted	in	a	crisis	of	illiquidity.	A	loan	from	the	IMF,	for	which	
Argentina	received	access	to	credits	for	$7	billion,	put	an	end	to	the	run.	(Javier	Arnaudo,	
Luis	Querol	and	Gustavo	Pérez,	2003)	
	
On	May	14,	1995,	Menem	was	reelected	and	announced	a	restructuration	of	the	
national	financial	system,	focused	on	a	concentration	and	an	increase	in	banks’	foreign-
ownership.	In	fact,	9	of	the	10	biggest	banks	in	Argentina	were	taken	over	by	foreign	
banks.		
	 	
During	the	1990s	three	more	external	shocks	outlined	below	took	place	and	once	
more,	 they	 encouraged	 investors	 to	 distrust	 Argentina’s	 ability	 to	 overcome	 the	
recessive	periods.	History	repeated	itself.	Capital	outflows	led	to	higher	interest	rates	
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and	more	progressive	indebtedness	whose	perverse	dynamic	eventually	led	to	default	
in	December	2001.		
• The	Asian	Crisis	of	1997.	A	period	of	financial	difficulty	that	gripped	Asia	
and	raised	fears	of	a	global	economic	disaster	due	to	financial	contagion.	
It	started	on	July	2,	1997,	with	the	devaluation	of	the	Thai	currency.	Due	
to	a	domino	effect,	there	were	numerous	devaluations	in	other	nearby	
countries	like	the	Philippines	and	Malaysia.	One	of	the	consequences	was	
that	international	investors	were	reluctant	to	lend	money	to	developing	
countries.	Also,	 there	was	a	 reduction	 in	 the	price	of	oil	 that	caused	a	
financial	hardship	in	OPEC	member	countries	and	other	oil	exporters.	
• The	Russian	Default	of	1998.	It	was	exacerbated	by	the	decline	in	world	
commodity	prices	due	to	the	Asian	Crisis	of	1997.	Oil	was	one	of	Russia’s	
resource	to	 increase	the	government’s	revenue	and	its	deep	fall	 in	the	
price	had	severe	consequences.		
• Brazil’s	 currency	 devaluation	 in	 1999.	 Russia’s	 economic	 crisis	 crossed	
land	and	 sea	 to	 contaminate	Brazil.	 To	 try	 to	 stop	 the	massive	 capital	
flight,	there	were	a	series	of	monetary	policies	including	interest	rates’	
increase.	As	of	September	1998,	reserves	had	fallen	by	more	than	$50	
billion.	The	government	devaluated	the	currency,	the	Real,	around	a	30%	
in	relation	to	the	U.S.	Dollar	to	curb	the	exit	of	reserves,	attract	capital	
and	increase	national	exports.	(Leonardo	Lanotti,	2010).	
	
After	Menem’s	presidency,	in	1999	Fernándo	De	la	Rúa	became	President.	Once	
he	and	his	team	got	to	the	office,	they	found	the	economic	situation	worse	than	they	
expected.	Foreign	debt	reached	an	explosive	figure	of	$144,657	million,	equivalent	to	
almost	52%	of	GDP,	which	was	of	$279,511	million.	However,	they	decided	to	continue	
with	the	convertibility.	(La	Nación,	2000)	
	
De	la	Rúa’s	economic	team	believed	that	the	previous	fiscal	mismanagement	was	
the	cause	of	the	country’s	economic	problems	and	that	to	restore	economic	stabilization	
he	 had	 to	 address	 the	 public-sector	 deficit.	 Therefore,	 in	 2000,	 he	 implemented	 an	
increase	of	taxes,	known	was	the	“Impuestazo”	(“big	tax”):	the	non-taxable	minimum	
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	 income	was	lowered	from	4,800	pesos	to	4,020	pesos	(La	Nación,	2006).	Also,	on	
May	29,	2000,	the	government	instated	measures	to	cut	$1	billion	in	public	spending	
(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	For	example,	state	salaries	were	decreased.	
The	adopted	reforms	during	his	presidency	only	aggravated	the	situation	as	Argentines	
had	less	disposable	income	to	spend,	fact	that	delayed	the	economic	recovery.	A	lot	of	
protests	took	place.	
	
Near	the	end	of	the	year,	in	December	2000,	De	la	Rúa,	his	Minister	of	economy,	
José	Luis	Machinea,	and	international	and	domestic	financial	institutions	negotiated	a	
$40	billion	loan	package	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	The	government	
agreed	 to	 use	 this	 money	 to	 pay	 off	 debts	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 boost	 investor	
confidence.	This	would	reduce	country	risk	and,	consequently,	lower	cost	of	financing	
for	the	Government	and	the	private	sector.	The	loan	received	the	name	of	the	“blindaje”	
which,	according	 to	 the	dictionary	of	 the	Spanish	Royal	Academy,	means	“to	protect	
externally	with	various	materials,	especially	with	metal	plates,	things	or	places	against	
the	effects	of	bullets,	fire,	etc.”.		
	
The	 new	 targets	 exceeded	 the	 governments	 capabilities	 and	 in	 early	 2001,	 it	
became	 apparent	 that	 the	 operation	 was	 far	 from	 being	 productive.	 It	 increased	
mistrust,	 the	measures	 deepened	 recession	 and	 the	 resources	were	 directed	 to	 the	
capital	flight.	In	February	2001,	Argentina	swapped	$4	billion	in	bonds	that	were	due	to	
mature	soon	for	longer-term	bonds.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015)	
	
4.4.2. Cavallo	as	Minister	of	Economy	
	 	 	
	 In	March	 2000,	 there	was	 a	 strong	 rise	 of	 the	 country’s	 risk	 premium,	which	
surpassed	1,000	basis	points,	a	fall	in	international	reserves	by	$3.2	billion	and	a	leakage	
of	 deposits	 by	$4.4	billion	 (Enrique	 Szewach,	 2001).	 In	 this	 context,	Minister	Cavallo	
assumed	 the	 economic	 lead	 and	 quickly	 adopted	 emergency	 measures.	 The	 most	
important	ones	were	the	approval	of	a	tax	on	financial	transactions	and	the	so-called	
Competitiveness	Law.	The	former	taxed	the	movements	in	current	bank	accounts	and	
checking	deposits	in	saving	banks.	The	Competitiveness	Law	consisted	of	a	delegation	
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of	 powers	 from	 the	 Congress	 to	 the	 Executive	 Branch.	 But	 it	 explicitly	 excluded	 the	
possibility	of	reducing	public	wages	and	pensions	and	the	privatization	of	companies	or	
state	entities.	
	 	
	 Despite	 these	 attempts	 to	 clean	 up	 image	 of	 Argentina,	 the	 perception	 of	
international	 financial	 agents	 was	 still	 that	 the	 country	 was	 not	 ready	 to	 meet	 its	
financial	 commitments	 in	 the	 future.	 The	 high	 external	 indebtedness,	 the	 low	
competitiveness	and	the	strong	fiscal	imbalance	were	the	main	arguments	used.		
	
In	these	circumstances,	the	government	announced,	at	the	beginning	of	June	2001,	a	
“Megacanje”	(“Mega	swap”),	which	extended	the	maturities	of	$30	billion	in	debt	but	
at	a	higher	rate	of	interest,	around	15%	per	year	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	
2015).	 The	 amount	was	 significant	 and	 removed	 the	 risk	 of	 default	 in	 the	 short	 and	
medium	 term.	 However,	 in	 the	 longer	 term	 the	 problem	 of	 indebtedness	 was	
aggravated.	 The	Argentine	 economy	had	 to	 find	 a	 path	of	 growth	 that	 allowed	 it	 to	
generate	 sufficient	 resources	and	demonstrate	 that	 it	 could	 recover	 its	 financial	 and	
fiscal	solvency.		
	
The	government	publically	recognized	that	the	fiscal	deficit	could	no	longer	be	
financed	and	introduced,	in	July	2001,	a	“zero-deficit”	policy.	The	policy	was	aimed	to	
end	deficit	spending	through	measures	like	a	reduction	in	pensions	and	state	salaries	of	
up	to	13%	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	The	government	was	then	able	
to	negotiate	a	new	agreement	with	the	IMF	and	that	was	approved	in	the	last	week	of	
August	2001.	It	was	essentially	a	support	for	a	total	amount	of	about	$8	billion,	of	which	
$5	billion	were	received	immediately.	(Rafael	di	Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	2002)	
	
	 At	the	end	of	2001,	in	a	context	of	sudden	fall	of	deposits	and	monetary	reserves,	
the	authorities	arranged	a	series	of	measures	aimed	at	avoiding	or	at	 least	hindering	
both	the	outflow	of	foreign	exchange	from	the	country	and	the	withdrawal	of	cash	from	
financial	institutions.	The	set	of	adopted	measures	was	called	the	“corralito”	and	are	as	
follows:	
• Set	a	limit	of	$250	per	week	per	person	for	cash	withdrawals,	
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	 • Forced	banking	through	the	use	of	credit	cards,	debit	cards,	checks	and	
bank	transfers	within	Argentina,		
• New	bank	loans	could	only	be	nominated	in	dollars,		
• Control	of	payments	and	transfers	abroad	and	limitation	to	the	exit	of	the	
country	with	dollars	in	cash.	
Although	the	“corralito”	managed	to	decrease	capital	flight,	it	had	a	negative	impact	on	
economic	activity	because	it	paralyzed	the	daily	buying	and	selling	operations.	
	
Soon	after,	on	December	5,	2002,	the	IMF	suspended	the	payout	of	funds	as	the	
country	 was	 not	 keeping	 up	 with	 the	 condition	 they	 asked	 for,	 which	 was	 the	
continuation	 of	 the	 austerity	 measures.	 Consequently,	 on	 December	 17,	 the	
government	announced	a	new	plan	with	large	spending	cuts.	The	intention	was	to	cut	
spending	 a	 20%.	 This,	 added	 to	 the	 record	 of	 16.4%	 of	 unemployment	 since	 1990,	
caused	a	discontent	in	the	population	that	did	marches	to	the	presidential	to	show	their	
rage.	(Rafael	di	Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	2002)	
	
De	la	Rúa	was	forced	to	resign	on	December	21,	2001.	The	following	two	weeks,	
Argentina	had	five	different	presidents,	until	January	2,	2002,	when	Duhalde	took	the	
power.	
	
4.5. Default	and	Collapse	of	the	Convertibility	Regime	
	
The	year	2001	ended	with	a	very	unstable	political	and	economic	situation.	The	
real	GDP	growth	was	negative	-4.5%,	the	foreign	debt	was	of	$148.5	billions	and	the	
international	reserves	equaled	$25.2	billions	(Huw	Pill,	2002).	On	January	3,	2002,	just	
one	day	after	Duhalde	had	become	president,	Argentina	defaulted	on	its	foreign	debt:	
• $81.8	 billion	 in	 private	 debts,	 debt	 held	 by	 private	 investor	 globally	
(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015),	
• $6.3	billion	to	the	Paris	Club	(Michael	H.	Moffet,	2016),	an	association	of	
creditor	governments	working	to	reorganize	sovereign	debt;	and	
• $9.5	billion	to	the	IMF.	(Michael	H.	Moffet,	2016)	
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In	reality,	it	was	almost	the	formal	recognition	of	a	situation	that	had	been	dragging	on	
for	some	time,	when	the	international	credit	had	been	cut	to	the	country.		
	
	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 new	 economic	 authorities	 launched	 a	 program,	
which	 established	 as	 basic	 principles	 the	 pesofication	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 the	
devaluation	of	the	exchange	rate.	Pesofication	was	the	chosen	alternative	against	the	
full	dollarization	of	the	economy,	while	the	correction	of	the	exchange	rate	meant	the	
end	of	 the	monetary	Convertibility	 regime,	which	had	 governed	during	 the	previous	
decade	
	
	 The	currency	devaluation	was	set,	with	a	new	fixed	parity	of	1.40	pesos	for	each	
U.S.	Dollar	 for	 commercial	operations,	and	allowed	a	dual	exchange	 rate	 to	 float	 for	
other	transactions.	Finally,	 in	the	face	of	external	pressure	and	the	constraints	of	the	
IMF,	the	authorities	decided	in	February	to	move	towards	a	single	market	and	with	free	
flotation.	The	exchange	rate	increased	faster	than	expected.	On	October	8,	2002,	the	
price	of	the	dollar	reached	3.76	pesos	and	settled	at	the	end	of	the	year	at	3.39	pesos.	
(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	
	
The	devaluation	caused:	
• A	rise	 in	poverty	due	to	the	rise	 in	the	price	of	 trade-ables	 (like	 food),	which	
nearly	 doubled.	 In	 2002,	 according	 to	 the	 World	 Bank	 Group,	 the	
unemployment	rate	increased	to	19.6%	and	it	was	reported	that	nearly	a	54%	
of	 the	nation	was	 living	under	the	poverty	 line.	 (Rafael	Di	Tela	and	Fernanda	
Miguel,	2015).	
• A	 problem	 regarding	 debts.	 70%	 of	 bank	 deposits	 and	 a	 79%	 of	 loans	were	
denominated	in	Dollars,	but	due	to	the	pesofication	they	had	to	be	converted	
at	 a	 depreciated	 exchange	 rate	 and	 therefore	 were	 increased.	 Duhalde	
established	as	a	solution	that	all	the	debts	superior	to	$100,000	could	still	be	
converted	to	pesos	with	the	1	peso	1	dollar	exchange	rate.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	
Ingrid	Vogel,	2004).	
• A	problematic	situation	for	banks.	There	were	depositors	who	had	kept	“dollar”	
accounts	 but	 now	 insisted	on	 recovering	 their	 deposits	 adjusted	by	 the	 new	
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	 exchange	rate,	allowing	them	to	recover	the	initial	amount	of	dollars	they	had	
deposited.	The	problem	was	that,	those	accounts	had	already	been	converted	
to	peso	following	the	new	administration’s	policies,	so	banks	could	not	comply.		
Duhalde’s	response	was	that	public’s	bank	deposits	had	to	be	converted	at	a	
rate	of	1.4	pesos	per	dollar.	 In	contrast,	bank	 loans	had	to	be	converted	at	a	
one-to-one	peso-to-dollar	rate.	
	
In	2003,	Argentina’s	situation	started	to	get	a	better	(The	World	Bank	Group):		
• Inflation	decreased	from	25.87%	in	2002	to	13.44%.	
• Unemployment	went	from	19.6%	in	2002	to	13.52%.	
• The	exchange	rate	relatively	stabilized	at	around	2.8	pesos	per	dollar.	(Rafael	
Di	Tela	and	Ingrid	Vogel,	2004)	
• Consumer	confidence	was	rising	as	the	country	risk	premium	was	falling.	
	
4.6. The	Recovery		
	
	 In	2003,	with	the	month	of	April	came	new	presidential	elections.	Now	it	was	
time	 for	 Néstor	 Kirchner	 to	manage	 the	 country	 and	 he	 decided	 to	 do	 so	 with	 the	
economic	team	of	Duhalde.		
	
4.6.1. Renegotiation	of	the	debt	 	
	
	 President	Néstor	Kirchner	carried	out	the	largest	sovereign	debt	renegotiation	
so	far,	of	nearly	$100	billion.	On	September	22,	2003,	based	on	the	argument	that	the	
Argentine	debt	had	exploded	since	the	devaluation	of	the	peso	against	the	dollar,	he	
offered	a	75%	“haircut”16	with	no	recognition	of	past-due	interests.	He	assured	that	the	
country	could	only	afford	 to	pay	25%	of	 the	debt.	He	also	argued	that	 the	offer	was	
consistent	with	their	target	of	a	primary	budget	surplus17	of	3%	of	GDP.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	
and	Fernanda	Miguel,	2015).	
																																																						
16 A “haircut” is a total reduction in the net present value of a debt obligation due to: (1) a reduction in the principal of 
the obligation; (2) a reduction in the interest rates; (3) an extension of the obligation’s maturity. 
17	The	primary	Budget	surplus	represents	the	amount	of	money	that	the	government	has	available	to	make	interest	
payments	or	pay	down	outstanding	debt.		
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	 As	it	was	to	be	expected,	creditors	did	not	accept	Kirchner’s	offer.	Instead,	they	
demanded	a	“haircut”	of	no	more	than	40%	and	a	full	recognition	of	past-due	interests.	
Argentina	was	not	flexible	regarding	the	reduction	of	the	“haircut”	but	agreed	to	share	
a	10%	of	the	growth	of	GDP	above	3%	between	the	increased	interest	payments	and	the	
amortization	of	the	outstanding	debt.	No	arrangement	took	place.	(Rafael	Di	Tela	and	
Ingrid	Vogel,	2004)	
	
	 After	three	years	of	continuous	disputes,	 in	2005,	Argentina	enacted	the	Lock	
Law	which	prohibited	the	Argentine	state	from	making	arrangements	to	pay	bonds	that	
had	not	been	exchanged.	This	law	was	seen	by	the	government	as	an	incentive	for	the	
bondholder	to	accept	their	offers.	
	
	 In	mid-January,	2005,	the	Argentine	government	proposed	to	the	creditors	the	
possibility	of	receiving	26%	to	30%	of	the	net	present	value	of	the	original	face	value	of	
bonds	obligations.	It	was	a	“take	it	or	leave	it”	offer,	 in	other	words,	a	one-time-only	
offer.	Most	of	the	bondholders,	a	76.07%	accepted	the	offer	and	the	outstanding	debt	
was	reduced	from	$81.8	billion	to	$18.6	billion.		
	
	 The	following	year,	Argentina	repaid	the	$9.5	billion	debt	to	the	IMF.	As	for	the	
debt	owed	to	the	Paris	Club,	in	2008	and	2010,	the	government	announced	that	it	would	
repay	them,	but	in	each	case	reneged.		
	
	 In	2010,	another	attempt	to	end	with	the	remaining	outstanding	debt	was	made.	
To	do	so,	they	had	to	suspend	the	Lock	Law.	Argentina’s	creditors	agreed	to	new	debt	
swap	deal	worth	around	$12	billion.	Now,	the	outstanding	debt	had	been	reduced	to	
$6.6	billions.	With	this	new	arrangement,	92%	of	all	original	debtors	had	now	exchanged	
the	original	debt,	but	there	was	still	a	remaining	8%	of	holdouts.	
	
This	 last	 group	 of	 holders,	 that	 was	 asking	 to	 receive	 a	 full	 payment,	 took	
Argentina	 to	 the	U.S	Disctrict	Court,	as	 the	debt	was	governed	under	New	York	 law.	
Argentina,	even	having	lost	several	series	of	ruling,	still	refused	to	pay.	In	February	2012,	
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	 New	 York	 District	 Court	 Judge	 Thomas	Griesa	 upheld	 a	 lower-court	 ruling	 that	
Argentina	could	not	make	payments	on	its	restructured	bonds	unless	it	also	paid	back	
defaulted	bondholders.	The	Argentine	authorities	said	that	they	could	not	settle	with	
the	 holdouts	 because	 if	 they	 did,	 the	 exchange	 bond	 holders	 with	 whom	 they	 had	
agreed	in	2005,	could	sue	for	equal	treatment	by	invoking	the	Rights	Upon	Future	Offer	
(RUFO)	clause,	which	had	been	part	of	the	agreement	in	2005.	The	RUFO	is	a	clause	used	
in	certain	contracts	in	which	a	party	who	has	agreed	to	contractual	terms,	gains	certain	
rights	if	other	parties	in	future	obtain	better	or	different	terms.	Therefore,	the	exchange	
bond	holders	could	also	ask	to	receive	their	 full	payment,	which	Argentina	could	not	
afford	to	pay	and	decided	to	appeal.		
	
By	 October	 2012,	 Argentina	 lost	 its	 appeal,	 the	 U.S.	 Second	 Circuit	 Court	 of	
Appeals	 in	 New	 York	 confirmed	 the	 decision	 of	 Judge	 Griesa	 and	 by	 November,	 he	
reissued	the	injunction	forcing	Argentina	to	comply	with	payments.	This	announcement	
made	Argentine	bonds	 fall	 sharply	as	market	perceived	the	risk	 that	Argentina	could	
default	on	its	payments	one	more	time.		
	
By	March	29,	the	Argentine	government	was	forced	to	submit	a	proposal	on	how	
they	were	going	to	pay	the	holdouts.	Argentina	was	offering	to	pay	holdouts	20	cents	
on	 every	 U.S.	 Dollar	 of	 the	 amount	 owed.	 As	 it	 was	 to	 be	 expected,	 in	 April	 2013,	
holdouts	 rejected	 the	 proposal,	 leaving	 a	 US	 appeals	 court	 to	 decide	 whether	
Argentina’s	proposal	complied	with	the	ruling	that	holdout	creditors	must	be	treated	
the	 same	 as	 investors	who	held	 its	 restructured	bonds.	 In	 February	 2014,	Argentina	
again	appealed	to	the	US	Supreme	Court,	asking	it	to	reverse	the	lower-court	rulings.	
The	US	Supreme	Court	rejected	Argentina’s	appeal.		
	
Alex	Kiciloff,	 the	Minister	of	economy	of	Argentina	 from	2013	 to	2015,	made	
public	 his	 decision	not	 to	negotiate	with	 the	holdouts	 and	 simultaneously	deposited	
$832	million	in	a	New	York	bank	to	pay	exchanged	bonds.		This	was	meant	to	put	the	
American	banks	in	a	very	tense	situation	since	to	distribute	the	money	went	against	the	
ruling	of	the	courts.	 In	fact,	they	were	told	by	the	District	Court	to	not	distribute	the	
payments	unless	the	holdouts	creditors	were	also	paid.	Argentina	washed	their	hands	
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and	said	that	because	they	had	deposited	the	money	in	the	banks,	their	creditors	had	
been	paid,	but	the	court	disagreed.	The	U.S.	Supreme	Court	still	ordered	that	Argentina	
had	to	pay	the	holdouts,	amounting	to	a	payment	of	$1.5	billion	dollars	(John	Hartley,	
2014).	 	 Since	 the	parties	 failed	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement,	 on	 June	30,	 2014,	Argentina	
entered	a	“technical”	default	on	its	restructured	debt.	  
	
4.6.2. Argentina’s	return	to	international	trading	
	
In	December	2015,	Mauricio	Macri	assumed	the	presidency	and	carried	out	the	
resumption	 of	 negotiations	 with	 the	 holdouts	 with	 a	 view	 to	 Argentina’s	 return	 to	
international	trading	and	financial	relations.	This	time	negotiations	took	on	a	different	
approach	and	were	initially	marked	by	the	willingness	of	the	new	government	to	pay.		
	
Within	a	month	of	assuming,	the	Macri	Government	negotiating	team	met	for	
the	first	time	with	Daniel	Pollack,	the	court-appointed	mediator.	Following	a	relatively	
short	period	of	negotiations	in	the	New	York	courts,	nearly	90%	of	the	holdouts	accepted	
Argentina’s	proposal,	to	pay	the	debt	with	a	25%	reduction,	and	Judge	Griesa	ordered	
his	injunction	preventing	Argentina	from	paying	other	creditors	to	be	lifted.	
	
Finally,	 on	 19	 April	 a	 successful	 bond	 issue	 of	 $16,500	 millions	 enabled	 the	
country	to	cancel	its	debt	to	the	holdouts	in	cash.	On	April	22,	$9,300	millions	were	paid	
to	holdouts	and	the	remaining	$7,200	were	deposited	in	the	Central	Bank	in	order	to	
finance	the	deficit	of	the	public	accounts.	Following	the	lifting	of	the	injunction,	payment	
was	made	to	the	holders	of	debt	from	the	swaps	who	had	not	received	payments	since	
June	2014,	thus	enabling	Argentina	to	put	the	default	behind	it,	which	was	reflected	in	
upgrades	to	its	credit	ratings.		
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	 5. DOING	BUSINESS	IN	2017	
	
	 The	aim	of	 this	part	of	 the	project	 is	 to	 summarize	 the	positive	and	negative	
points	that	someone	who	is	thinking	of	starting	a	business	in	Argentina	should	have	in	
mind.	In	order	to	do	so,	I	have	decided	to	use	a	SWOT	Analysis	(Strengths,	Weaknesses,	
Opportunities	and	Threats).	
	
	
5.1. Strengths	
	
- Argentina	continues	to	be	a	world	leader	in	agricultural	exports.	The	World	Trade	
Organization	 estimates	 that	 it	 is	 the	 10th	 top	 exporter	 country	 in	 the	 world.	
According	to	the	WTO,	 in	2015,	total	exports	of	agricultural	products	equaled	
$2.2	billion.	
- It	has	a	lot	of	important	natural	resources:	fertile	plains	of	the	pampas,	lead,	zinc,	
tin,	copper,	iron	ore,	manganese,	petroleum,	uranium	and	arable	land.			
- Buenos	Aires	is	one	of	South	America’s	main	trade	hubs.	
- Argentina	has	the	second	highest	per	capita	income	level	in	Latin	America,	after	
Chile.	Additionally,	the	IMF	expects	per	capita	GDP	to	grow	until	2022,	when	it	is	
expected	 to	 be	 of	 $19,464	 per	 capita.	 In	 2016,	 Argentina’s	 GDP	 per	 capita	
reached	 $10,051,	 in	 Chile	 of	 $12,938	 and	 in	 Mexico	 and	 Brazil,	 $8,415	 and	
$7,447,	respectively.	(The	International	Monetary	Fund)	
- Among	the	Latin	American	countries,	Argentina	stands	out	for	having	expanded	
the	 number	 of	 its	 trading	 partners.	 It	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	world	 trade	
networks.		
- Recovered	 good	 standing	 with	 IMF	 after	 agreement	 with	 holdouts	 and	
implementation	 of	 reform	 agenda	 by	 Macri,	 which	 has	 led	 to	 improved	
international	relationships.		
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5.2. Weaknesses		
	
- High	 inflation	 following	 the	devaluation	of	 the	currency	 remains	a	 substantial	
drag	on	consumer	purchasing	power.	After	Macri’s	election	in	2015,	he	pushed	
the	devaluation	of	the	peso	of	as	much	as	a	30%	relative	to	the	U.S.	Dollar	which	
led	to	an	increase	in	inflation.	
- Businesses	face	high	labor	costs	as	wages	are	rising	fast	to	keep	up	with	rampant	
inflation.	In	May	2016,	the	minimum	wage	increased	a	33%,	from	6,060	pesos	to	
8,060	pesos	($572.40)	per	month.	(Anthony	Esposito,	2016)	
- Two	 sovereign	 defaults	 since	 the	 turn	 of	 century	 have	 undermined	 investor	
confidence	in	Argentina’s	willingness	to	pay	its	debts,	driving	interest	rates	up.	
- Uneven	wealth	distribution.	
- High	levels	of	perceived	corruption	undermine	public	trust	in	the	police	force.	
According	to	the	global	coalition	against	corruption,	The	Corruption	Perceptions	
Index18,	 which	 scores	 countries	 on	 how	 corrupt	 their	 public	 sector	 is,	 has	
increased	to	36	in	2016,	being	of	32	in	2015.	It	 is	a	high	number	compared	to	
Mexico,	whose	index	is	of	30,	but	not	as	high	as	Brazil	or	Chile,	whose	indexes	
are	of	40	and	66,	 respectively.	However,	 it	 is	not	a	 low	number	compared	 to	
other	countries	in	the	world.		
- Even	though	subsidies	for	electricity	are	gradually	being	decreased,	businesses	
enjoy	 low	 cost	 of	 electricity	 but	 this	 has	 led	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 investment	 in	
infrastructure	 resulting	 in	 problems	 with	 generation	 and	 distribution.	 Power	
shortages	 are	 frequent,	 particularly	 at	 peak	 times	 during	 summer	 months.	
Blackouts	therefore	seriously	affect	business	activity	in	Argentina.	The	price	of	
electricity	 is	 8.819	US	 cents	 per	 kWh,	 one	of	 the	 cheapest	 of	 the	 region.	 For	
example,	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Brazil,	the	price	is	of	20.4	US	cents	per	kWh	and	in	
Chile	it	is	of	10.5	US	cents	per	kWh.	(The	World	Bank	Group)	
	
	
	
																																																						
18 The Index is prepared by representatives of more tan 100 countries. It is a politically non-partisan  group.  
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	 5.3. Opportunities	
	
- The	Argentine	 economy	has	 significant	 long-term	 growth	 potential	 due	 to	 its	
natural	resource	wealth	and	highly	educated	labor	force.		
- Advancements	in	natural	gas	extraction	technology	hold	the	potential	to	make	
Argentina’s	vast	shale	gas	reserve	accessible.	
- Renewed	openness	 to	 foreign	 investment	will	 allow	 firms	 to	 reverse	 years	of	
underinvestment	in	key	sectors,	including	agriculture,	power	and	energy.	
- President	 Mauricio	 Macri	 will	 continue	 to	 improve	 the	 country’s	 business	
environment	through	a	series	of	regulatory	and	fiscal	reforms.	
- High	potential	of	renewable	energies.	
- Cooperative	development	on	research	and	technology.	
- A	surge	in	available	capital	will	allow	firms	to	expand	in	areas	that	had	long	been	
restricted	 by	 capital	 and	 price	 controls	 under	 the	 previous	 administration,	
including	energy,	manufacturing	and	real	estate.		
- Experts	 from	 the	 IMF	predict	 that	unemployment	 is	 going	 to	decrease	 in	 the	
future.	 The	 unemployment	 rate	 for	 2016	 was	 estimated	 of	 8.47%	 and	 it	 is	
expected	to	decrease	until	2022,	where	it	will	reach	the	value	of	6.1%.		
- The	 manufacturing	 sector	 exports	 are	 likely	 to	 improve	 as	 firms	 leverage	
renewed	access	to	foreign	capital	markets	to	invest	in	upgrading	and	expanding	
productive	 capacity,	 benefitting	 from	 a	 weaker	 currency	 that	 has	 bolstered	
export	competitiveness.	Additionally,	a	modest	rebound	in	Brazilian	economic	
activity	 will	 provide	 tailwinds	 to	 Argentine	 exporters,	 given	 that	 Brazil	 is	
Argentina’s	largest	export	market.			
- Government	 revenues	 are	 expected	 to	 grow.	 Argentina’s	 fiscal	 position	 is	
expected	 to	 improve	 through	 2017,	 driven	 primarily	 by	 a	 strong	 rebound	 in	
economic	activity.	It	is	expected	that	rising	investment	and	export	demand	will	
drive	a	recovery	that	will	underpin	robust	government	revenue	growth	 in	the	
coming	 years.	 Over	 the	 year,	 additional	 revenue	 will	 come	 from	 the	
implementation	on	August	1	of	a	tax	program	meant	to	encourage	repatriation	
of	undeclared	assets	held	 abroad.	 Individuals	will	 be	 able	 to	 choose	 to	pay	a	
relatively	small	fine	to	invest	on	low-coupon	government	bonds.	
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- Debt	 Costs	 are	 expected	 to	 fall.	 Expenditure	 growth	 will	 be	 constrained	 as	
subsidies	are	gradually	removed,	for	example	subsidies	on	the	price	of	electricity,	
gas	and	transport,	as	well	as	the	reduction	of	total	payrolls	in	the	public	sector.	
It	is	predicted	by	the	IMF	that	the	general	government	total	expenditure	in	2021	
will	have	decreased	to	a	percentage	of	GDP	of	38.8%,	while	 in	2016	 it	was	of	
42.23%.	Argentina	has	been	met	with	extremely	positive	investor	interest,	which	
will	allow	it	to	gradually	refinance	its	debt	obligations	at	more	favorable	interest	
rates.		
- Argentina’s	sovereign	credentials	will	strengthen	over	the	coming	years	despite	
its	fiscal	shortfalls	and	rising	debt	load.	The	gradual	narrowing	of	its	fiscal	deficit,	
coupled	 with	 its	 pro-investment	 policy	 orientation,	 will	 allow	 it	 to	 maintain	
investor	 interest	 over	 the	 coming	 years	 and	 likely	 benefit	 from	 credit	 rating	
upgrades20.	
	
	
5.4. Threats	
	
- Inflation	 has	 increased	 in	 the	 last	 year	 from	 28.4%	 in	 2015	 to	 41%	 in	 2016.	
(Coface,	2017)	
- Currency	weakness	 and	 slow	progress	on	 fiscal	 consolidation	will	 continue	 to	
drive	high	inflation	in	the	coming	quarters.		
- Government	interference	in	markets	is	hard	to	predict.	
- Strong	concentration	of	exports	on	just	a	few	agricultural	products.	
- Potential	 electrical	 energy	 crisis.	 Argentina	 presents	 a	 demand/supply	
imbalance.		On	the	one	hand,	demand	is	not	high	enough	because	the	population	
cannot	pay	the	full	price	of	the	energy.	On	the	other	hand,	the	problem	of	supply	
is	 caused	 because	 there	 has	 not	 been	 enough	 investment	 to	 have	 a	 good	
structure	of	generation	and	distribution,	which	makes	prices	more	expensive.		
- According	 to	 the	 IMF,	Argentina’s	current	balance	account	 is	going	 to	decline	
from	-$7.253	billions	in	2016	to	-$16.599	billion	in	2021.		
																																																						
20 The system of rating securities was originated by John Moody in 1909. The purpose of Moody’s ratings is to provide 
investors with a simple system of gradation by which future relative creditworthiness of securities may be gauged. 
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	 - Weaker	external	demand	from	key	trading	partners	such	as	China,	Brazil,	and	
Venezuela	will	cap	growth	in	the	coming	five	years.		
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6. Conclusion	
	
	
	 The	first	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	extensive	study	is	that	it	is	not	
possible	to	blame	a	single	phenomenon,	political	leader,	social	class	or	an	economic	plan	
for	the	poor	results	and	crisis	over	the	course	of	Argentina.	The	Argentine	decay	was	a	
slow	 process	 in	 which	 several	 negative	 economic	 and	 political	 elements	 created	
resistance	to	development	and	contributed	to	accelerating	the	country’s	misfortune.		
	
Additionally,	 external	 phenomena	 such	 as	 globalization,	 the	 world	 wars,	 the	
global	economic	crises,	among	others,	coupled	with	Argentina’s	strong	dependence	on	
other	 economies,	 have	 undoubtedly	 contributed	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 Argentina.	 For	
instance,	 in	 the	 agriculture	 sector,	with	 the	 “Agro-export”	model,	Argentina	became	
heavily	dependent	on	the	European	Continent,	especially	on	Great	Britain.	This	exposed	
Argentina	 to	 the	 economic	 cycles	 of	 Europe,	 which	 entered	 in	 recession	 with	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	World	War	 I,	 affecting	Argentina	 although	not	 being	 involved	 in	 it.	
Another	example	of	dependence	was	the	Convertibility	Plan.	Fixing	an	exchange	rate	to	
another	currency,	like	in	the	case	of	Argentina	who	linked	peso	to	the	US	Dollar,	provides	
stability	and	reduces	inflation	in	the	short	term	but,	in	the	long	term,	can	create	worse	
imbalances.	 With	 this	 measure,	 the	 monetary	 policy	 of	 Argentina	 was	 directly	
dependent	on	the	monetary	policy	of	the	United	States	and,	of	course,	the	dynamics	of	
the	US	economy	were	not	the	same	as	the	ones	that	Argentina	needed	at	the	time,	so	
the	system	ended	in	failure.	
		
However,	all	countries	have	resented	international	phenomena	in	a	certain	way	
and	 most	 of	 them	 have	 been	 able	 to	 overcome	 their	 effects.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	
opportune	to	think	that,	in	the	case	of	Argentina,	internal	phenomena	were	the	ones	
that	really	held	the	country	back.	Therefore,	it	can	be	said	that	Argentina’s	failure	was	a	
product	of	both	bad	socio-economic	government	policies	and	the	lack	of	institutions	to	
create	successful	policies	when	Argentina	need	it	a	change,	and	possibly	an	electorate	
that	could	not	distinguish	between	reality	and	golden	promises.		
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	 	 Another	conclusion	is	the	importance	of	 investing	in	productive	sectors	of	the	
economy,	sectors	that	can	benefit	the	country	in	the	long	term.	Argentina	has	received	
a	lot	of	external	capital	throughout	its	history,	but	has	not	been	able	to	guide	the	flow	
that	enters	to	sectors	that	reactivate	the	economy.	It	has	allocated	a	lot	of	capital	to	
subsidies	 instead	 of	 creating	 a	 good	 infrastructure	 for	 roads,	 an	 energy	 distribution	
system.	
	
	 As	 for	 the	 future	 of	 Argentina,	 I	 believe	 it	 has	 a	 lot	 of	 potential.	 The	Macri	
government	 has	 taken	 the	 necessary	 or	 more	 obvious	 steps	 to	 make	 Argentina's	
economy	competitive.	For	example,	freeing	the	exchange	rate	or	negotiating	debt	with	
holdouts.	It	is	a	very	dynamic	economy	that,	although	it	depends	to	a	large	extent	on	
Brazil,	has	an	agricultural	and	an	energy	sector	 that	with	 the	correct	 investment	can	
become	very	 important.	Thanks	to	 its	 recent	opening	to	the	world,	a	 lot	of	capital	 is	
entering	 the	 country,	 so	 if	 Argentina	has	 learned	 from	 its	 past	 experience,	 it	 should	
invest	it	productive	sectors	like	the	previously	mentioned.		
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